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PREFACE 
When I first began to study American involvement in 
Vietnam, I became especially interested in the Kennedy years. 
I considered the escalation decision of 1961 pivotal in that 
it seemed to explain a number of factors in the nature and 
course of the continuation and intensification of American 
involvement. I felt a deeper investigation of the forces 
which defined the need and manner of intervention in this 
period would help me come to grips with a war I could neither 
accept nor understand. Also, growing up with the war on 
tefevision and the war at home, my earliest impressions about 
politics, about the world around me, were deeply entwined 
with the Vietnam war and my incoherent perceptions about it 
and about the way the American government seemed to handle 
it. Thus when I thought of Vietnam, I thought of the 1960s. 
However, as I read more, I saw that the United States 
had been involved in Vietnam much earlier than the Kennedy 
Administration, and I began to think that this involvement in 
the 1940s and 1950s was perhaps far more significant in terms 
of grasping the reasons behind American intervention and the 
attitudes which accompanied them. It seems very clear to me 
now that the years 1945-1950 were pivotal in that this period 
saw the first direct American assistance to Vietnam. This 
period is important because the Truman Administration did 
not inherit an already inexorable involvement. There were 
possibilities for some flexibility in policy, which would not 
be the case later on, and American credibility at least did 
not appear to be completely identified with success in 
Vietnam. 
I think the postwar years are crucial to the development 
of later policies and attitudes toward Southeast Asia, and 
saw the origins of a number of strategies, policies, 
perspectives, and perceptions which would be either 
intensified or perpetuated over the course of American 
involvement in Vietnam. Thus I wanted to study this period 
in the development of American policy toward Vietnam, so as 
to better understand the nature and course of later 
involvement, to gain an understanding of tho rO~30ns for the 
in.itial commitment, and to fit Americ:-lr1 poli.cy toward Vletnam 
~orld War II altogether. 
I would like to thank Gary Kornblith for his help, 
guidance, and, above all, patience, throughout this project. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM 
The Amer'ican involvement in Vietnam has moti va ted 
extensive scholarship and reflection from diverse segments of 
American society. The Vietnamese war for independence and 
the dynamics and nature of American intervention have been 
approached from the perspectives of many different 
disciplines and from all points on the political continuum. 
The majority of these works address, either directly or 
implicitly, the fundamental issue of how American involvement 
can be explained and understood. 
The historiography of American involvement in Vietnam 
covers a wide range of interpretations of the impetus behind 
the initial commitment, the reasons for progressive 
escalation, and the rationales for why the United States 
didn't "win." Though categorizing these analyses runs the 
risk of oversimplification, in the interest of clarity they 
are olassifiable in terms of the central imperatives behind 
intervention which they address. The salient issues these 
soholars bring to light can be further subdivided in that 
some are concerned with the motivations of intervention and 
others with the decision making process. The interpretations 
to be disoussed herein base the fact or character of United 
States involvement on the imperatives of the balance of 
power, the capitalist system, funerican ideology, the 
bureaucr~tic establishment, domestic electoral politiCS, and 
the concept of credibility. 
'1'ne balance of power approach bases American decision 
maKing toward Vietnam in pragmatism and traditional power 
politics. 'I11e proponents of this a;>proach interpret American 
actions as the resul-c of realistic coasideration of tne 
irl-cernational ::;ituation and of tHe necessities of national 
security. This interpretation taKes two main directions: 
one finds the motivation behind involvement in the need to 
maintain tne balance of world power with the Soviet Union, 
and the other sees the maintenance o.f liestern power on Asia 
as the determining factor. 
Tae former perspective views the aims of American policy 
toward Vietnam as grounded in the perception of a global 
Soviet threat and tile resultant need to counter this 
tt1roughout the world. Tne rise oI' communism in Asia was seen 
as an extension of Soviet power and influence, and tnerefore 
seeilled to necessitate action on the part of the Uilited 
3ta-ces. George Berring advances this argumeilt, stating that 
"tue United States intervened in Vietnam to Dloc~ tae 
apparent march of a Soviet-dil'ectea Communism across Asia." 
Accordin§, to Herring, American involvement was tnen escalatea 
1 
11"(,0 halt a presumably expansionist Co,nmunist Caina." With 
the growth of a globalist ciutlook in American policy maKing, 
it was increasingly considered in the interest of national 
security to stop the spreaa of communist influence in East 
Asia as elsewhere so as to maintain the balance of power 
Detween the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus the 
original ruaerican co~~itment in Vietnam ana subsequent 
escalations were motivated by the Cold \~ar view of tne world, 
anu any perceived Shift, or potential snift, in tne aalance 
of power in the favor of the Soviet union and its al.lies was 
considered a threat to national security. 
In coatrast, tIle other main interpretation of the 
balance of ~ower as the motivation behind American 
involvement ~ocates the roots of American support for tne 
French in Indochina in the need to strengthen and stabilize 
the Western powers. Gareth Porter makes this argument, ana 
asserts that the origins of the commitment to France 
lay not in the Cold i-Jar with the Soviet Union but in a 
set of attitudes and perceived interests regarding Asia 
and Africa that American officials held in COJJilllon with 
the French colonialists. While President FranKlin D. 
Roosevelt I s "lBrtime policy was strongly opposed to the 
restoration of French colonialism in Indoc!lina, tne 
State Department too~ a distinctly realpolitik approach 
in April 1945. It accepted as fact that colonialism 
would continue in Soutileast Asia ana that the United 
States could not afford to deny France its colonial role 
in Indochina, since france would be "weaKened as a world 
power."'::: 
Porter states that these State DepartmenL attltuaes cecame 
1,1 ~ 
policy after FDrt's death. Porter Intervrets this policy as 
bear-ed to Hard preserving ~iestern European colonialism, and 
based in ethnooentricity. It can oe argued, nowever, that 
American support of France as a West-ern european power 
relates to tne previous analysis. Tnat is, the United States 
sought to strengthen France vis a vis the Soviet Union in 
order to restore the European balance of power. 
The interpretation Hhich views the reasons for American 
involvement in Vietnam as pri...1larlly economic sees policy 
3 
maKing as equally rational and delioerat~, but sees the goal 
of intervention as the stabilization of. the capitalist 
s~stem. This view is advanceu OJ flidhard Du Boff, who states 
that Alflericar1 foreign policy in general serves tne goals of 
the ecodomic rullng class. Du Boff argues that hi~h ana 
influential positions in the policY-Iilaking machine are 
largely dominated by memoers of the capitalist class, and 
foreign polic~ is not only molded to the objective of 
defending world capitalism, but derives its attitudes largely 
3 
from the ousiness outlOOK. 
A central element of this outlook is the value and need 
that is felt for expansion. ThUS capitalism is stabilizea 
tbrough the means of dominating foreign marKets and 
controllins tne resources of overseas economies. According 
to this perspective, then, the Unitea States became involved 
in Vietnam because of the economic imperative of gaii1ing 
access to Southeast Asian markets ana strategic raVl 
materials; eyually important is the denial of these resources 
to the 30viet bloc. 
Paul Josepn advocates the econolnic interpretation, but 
he states that this approach has ceen relativelj weakened 
oecause of the tendency to reduce internal state policy to 
e.{ternal social forces: 
intervention in Vietnam. 
II 'Capitalism' explains u.s. 
But 'capitalism' did not determine 
4 
the specific form of that intervention. II Thus he expands 
his perspective oy recognizing the validity of some elements 
of other interpretations in terms of the processes of .[.iO_LlCy 
making, notably tDe organization and oDJectives of tDe 
national security oureaucracy, 
5 
American intervention. 
and tne constraints on 
Tne ideological perspective uases American intervention 
in Vietnam 011 less tangiole motivations. At the heart of the 
ideological explanation is the anticommunist consensus of the 
Cola War. Advocates of this approach see stabilization of 
tne basic American system as the goal of United States 
foreign policy, and define the system as encompassinl 
political, economic, and social institutions. American 
policy is highly influencea oy the im.<>erativa of preserving 
the power of the United States ane American-oriented 
hations in oreier to maintain dnu in a sellse validate the 
oasic premises upon which American SOCiety and principles 
nave traditionally oeen oased. This percelved need is 
explained in relation to Vietnam as the result of tile 
increasing tendency to Vlew the world as involved in a kind 
of l'lanicnean struggle between the forces of American-
oriented capitalist democracy and those of Soviet-oriented 
communism in the Cold liar years. In light of tnis, it was 
considered increasingly important to defend the Amerlcan 
system a~ainst the Soviet threat. 
~y the late 194Gs, Soviet communism '.rias seen not 
merely as a tnreat to Loa Btaoility and "free world" 
orientation of ~estern Euro~e, out as a farcd to be combatted 
in the world at large. Since com~munism was perceived as an 
expansionist. gluDal threat, American policy maKers embracea 
i,lobalism in the formUlation of policies and strategies. The 
anticoHilllunist consensus was to prevail as an underlying 
assumption in United States decision making tllrougnout tile 
perioo of Al.:1erican involvement in Vietnaln and Has therefore a 
Key element of tile American ideological standpoint in these 
years. 
The ideological ~lperative has been analyzea as a 
product of the "arrogance of power." Sen. J. IHlliam 
fuloright argues that as a result of the position of the 
United States in the postwar world, the AJ:nerican approach to 
foreign policy oecame arrogant, though from a largely 
inbenuous outlook. Power corrupts, and from world power 
stems a feeling of omnipotence. Fuloright does not see 
F..mericau policy maKers as "extreme practitioners" of the 
arrogance of power on a level with for instance Nao or 
Stalin, out does point out that "the prOblem of excessive 
6 
ideological zeal is our proolem as well as tne corrnnunists I." 
~vnile ne argues that this is oased in genuine good intentions 
ana idealism, its effect is essentially tne same as that of 
expansionist imperialism, and Fulbright sees no place for 
this type of crusading mentality in contemporary foreign 
policy. 
While tnis inten)re ta tion of Amer ican invol vemen t in 
Vietnam deals primarily with ideological concepts and 
ideological. ardor, these lla-curally translate into policies. 
Principles sucn as containment dnd tne domino theorj, while 
I'ormula tea in consideration of r'ealpoli tiK, took on special. 
significance when approaciled frolfi the olack vs. wni te Cold 
Har world-view: "Going well Oeyo11Q oalance-of-power 
6 
considerations, every piece of territory oecame critical and 
every besieged nation a potential domino. Communism came to 
be seen as an infection to be quapantined rather than a 
7 
fopce to be judiciously and apppoppiately balanced. 1I Thus 
poliCY and self-perpetuating ideological momentwu -- in othep 
words, means ana ends -- merged in the Cold Har, accoraing to 
this perspective, and Vietnam became tne locus of this 
ideological power struggle. 
lhese analyses all address the forcds motivating 
Amepican intervention in Vietnam but do not attempt· to 
explain the policy maKing proodss itself or tne ~ffects it 
had on the natupe of Uniteti 0tates involvement. Tne 
"quagmire" tneory eAamines the pole of the washington 
6ecision maKing bureaucracy without questioning the oasic 
assumptions benind Arner.ican foreign policy. This approach 
fo\.!uses ot! inherent inadequacies and irra tionali ty wi thin the 
national security bureaucracy, and is tnerefore a critique of 
policy making means independent of ends. 
The leadin8 proponent of tne quagmire interpretation is 
Arthur M. Schlesingar, Jr. Schlesinger portrayed American 
policy toward Vietnam as a series of small steps, eacn 
acco,11panied by an optimi::ltlc certainty tllat it would De the 
last escalation necessary: 
And so tna POllOY of 
Sta~es deeper and 
r~trospect, Vietnam 
inadvertence. We 
'one more stapf lured tIle Unit.ed 
deeper lnto tne morass. In 
is a triumpn of the politics of· 
nave achieved our present 
entanglement, not after aue ana deliberate 
consideration, out through a series of small aeClSlons. 
It is not only idle out unfair to se~k out guilty 
l[,en •••• .t::ach step in tne deepeninb of t.ne AmeriCan 
commitment was reasonaoly regarded at the time as ti1e 
last tnat would be necessary. Yet, in retrospect, eacn 
step led only to the next, until we find ourselves 
entrapped today in that nightmare of American 
strategis"("s, a lanci Har in Asia -- a war vmicn no 
President, including President ,Johnson, desired or 
intended. The Vietnam story is a trageay wittwut 
villains. 0 
Schlesinger located the "villain" in the "Vietnam sLory" 
within the organization of tne decision-making bureaucrdcy. 
Because of the sheer si~e ano internal dynamics of the 
policy-making apparatus, presidents were not given adequate 
information u}Jon whicn to oase deci::>ons. Tnus in 
}Jrevailing atmos1Jhere of o;>timism, Unit.ed States invo.i.ven:ent 
was escalated dbain and again, oecause of miscalculations aGd 
misrepresentation, resulting from uureauuratic ineptituae. 
Tile reasons for optimism among policj-making bureaucrats 
have Oe*::n descrioed as relating primari..LY to the maintenance 
of personal prestii6e within the organization, involving such 
issues as the tendency to report what onets superior wanted 
to hear, the feeling that reporting Dad news was a personal 
failure, the tendency for optimism to breed continued 
optimism in sUDse4uent reports, ana the value placed in this 
') 
counLry on getcing the job done. 
The "military-inaustrial complex" analysis also examlnes 
the role of the national security bu.reaucracy in American 
intervention in Vietnam, but stands in contrast to the 
ljuagmire theorj I s empl1asls on inaayertance and ircationali ty 
within the policy maKing apparatus. Rather, this approach 
stresses rational and deliberate control. Advocates of 
the militarj-industrial complex interpretation sed Unitea 
states involvement in Vietnam as the result of foreign policy 
designed to serve the interests of the Pentagon and certain 
national industries, notably defense contracto~s. According 
to this point of view, the military has gained and exercised 
substantial power in the making of foreign policy, and the 
industries which supply the Pentagon have therefore become 
more powerful as well. This in a sense approaches the 
economic imperative interpretation, except that instead of 
seeing intervention as serving the interests of the whole 
capitalist class, this analysis differentiates the industries 
which have as their main customer the United States 
gQvernment with its high defense budget. Thus defense 
industries are able to spend vast amounts on research and 
development. One cost of this constant technological 
innovation is its self-generated momentum in terms of 
creating the pressures to use new defense technology as soon 
10 
as it is developed. 
Richard J. Barnet, one of the proponents of this thesis, 
sees the potential for slightly conflicting interests between 
state and industrial management, in that corporate goals are 
generally short-range economic profits and expansion, and 
state goals are usually less tangible long range gains. Yet 
he argues that corporate management has a substantial role 
"in shaping long-term poliCies, such as those affecting 
investment, availability, and use of resources, which are 
ultimately more important." Barnet goes on to state that 
"The corporations continue to exercise the dominant influence 
11 
in the SOCiety, but the power keeps passing to the state." 
Tnus, this perspective con&eoas, the United states intervenea 
in Vietnam because of the power and influence of the military 
with its brand of foreign policy, and because of the pressure 
t.o deraonstra te neH defense technology and strategies. . 
The "system worked" argument also analyzes the weans to 
H.marican involvement in Vietnam, concentrating more on the 
forces tnat motivated the aomestic decision ma..cing process 
than on those-vIhicn mo&ivated its oojectives. This 
interpretation stands largely In agreement with quag,nire 
sebool regarding its depiction of tIle .policy 
bureaucracy and the prevalence of deception and 
ma..cing 
self-
deception in government. Yet this perspective, as presen&ea 
by botn Leslie Gelb and Daniel Ellsberg, refutes of the 
quagmire ti1eory. They contend that presidents were given 
adequate information, despite the inherent proole[;1s within 
the decision making apparatus, and made conscious choices to 
perpetuate the stalemate in Vietnam. 
Gelb and Bllsberg concentrate in their analyses on the 
policy-maKing process, 0ut they ac;ree that a gtmeral 
anticommunist conseL1Sus was tile foundation of Amer ican 
foreign policy in the Vietnam years. It oecame imperative 
that ti1e United States not lose Vietnam to communism 0ecause 
of possible international ana domestic repercussions. 
American glooal concerns were mainly containment ana the 
maintenance of creaibility. Domestically, Gelo and Ellsoerg 
assert that the potential results of 1l1osingl! Vietnam 
involved such issues as loss of the president's personal 
10 
prestige anu his prospects for reelection, loss of j)ublic and 
Congressional support for the president's programs, both 
domestic and international, and increased prospects for d 
12 
right-wing backlash. 
Vietnam was established as a vital security interest, 
and, according to illsberg and Gelo, this assUfJption was 
neVer quesLionea as involvement was eswdlated. Yet the 
presidents and their advisors did not, could not, enact 
policies wnich would enable the Un~teu States to llwin" in 
Vietnam; ratner, oecause of ciomestic constraints, tney cho;:;e 
policies geared toward "not losing" in the si10rt run. 
Ells berg state;:; this in the form or' t\fO overall rules 
perceived by United States presidents: 1) "Do not lost the 
rest of Vietnam to Communist control before the next 
election" and 2), "Do not commit U.S. ground troops to a land 
13 
war in Asia. II Gelo concurs that presidents took steps 
vlhicn were minimally necessary and maximally feasible in view 
of the consensus that Vietnam mU3"C not be "lost" and the 
concomitant domestic constraints upon policy. The potential 
domestic repercussions suggested above kept presidents from 
acting too aggressively, yet tne consensus necessitated some 
form of action; llen<..!e "ena pulicy of continueQ staleffiat~ anu 
postponement of attempts to resolve the conf11ct. Gelo 
states that presidents acted as "braKeraen" in orOd:C to 
ameliorate pressures from haWKS a.nd doves, ootn within ana 
H 
outside the government. In this respeet, tnis versvective 
tends toward a pluralist interpretation of the constraints 
11 
upon presidential decision-maKing: 
The tactic of the mlnimally necessary decision makes 
optimum sense for the politics of the Presidency. Even 
our stronges~ Presidents have te~ded to shy away from 
decisive action •••• Too seldolli has tllere been forceful 
moral leadership; it may even be undemocratic. The 
small stey that maintains the momentum gives the 
President the chance to gather more political sup~ort. 
It ~ives the appearance of minimizing possible mistakes. 
It allows time to gauge r'eactions. 1:5 
Thus Gelb contends that the political-oureaucratic 
sys~em worKed tnrough tne course of Unitea States lnvolvement 
L1 terms of tne ultmiate goal of preventing the IIl08 s" of 
Vietnam to Communism witnin each presiobnt's tenure in 
office. Ellsoer6 basically concurs with tnis interpretation 
of American involvement and escalation in Viecnam. He 
presents his refutation of the quagmire interpretation via a 
decL::;ion model, the "Stalemate Hachine," through whicil he 
argues that escalations were enacted not under the optimistic 
assumption that each would be tne last necessary step, but in 
periods of pessimism when the poliCies chosen were all that 
could be done, given the rules constraining policy. 
Escala ~ion aecision.s were oriented tOHard IItile defensive aim 
of averting an immediate Communist taKeover" anu succeeded 
"not i;l terms of publicly avoweo. long-ran.ge a1ms, but 1n 
terms of the successive short-range aims and expectations 
16 
tnat Here actually ••• sallent in the \~hitc House." 
'Ine issue of credibility figures into most of the aoove 
analyses and serves in this sense to linK these diverse 
arguments. wnile crediDility has differing interpretations 
and different roles in both tne means to and enci::; of American 
policy toward Vietnam, it refers in tne conte.h:t of funerica{l 
12 
rpm 
intervention to symbolic politics, and the perceived need to 
demonstrate the fJrudence, power, trustworthiness, or 
practicability of American institut~o!lS, pO.Licies, ana 
intentions. 
The i..rnpera ti ve of. de~onstrating Unitea States 
credibility ties in with the balance of power objective in 
r8lation to military strengtn. Jonathan Schell presents the 
tnesis that in the nuclear age, power politics became 
defJendent upon the illusion of power: "Tne SUbstance of the 
nation's strength was useful only insofar as it enhanced the 
17 
image of strength." In oti"l""r Hords, tne inabillty to 
pi"ljsically aemonstrate military capaolilty necessitatea tne 
development of other forms to prove its existence. 'l'hus 
creaioility became a policy dll'ected tOHard tHe goal of 
acneiviue; a staole oalance of power, and is seen in tni;;; 
light by advocates of the interpretation of United States 
interventlon in Vietnam as motivated by realpolitik 
considerations. 
Symbolic politics has a place in the economic argument 
as well. Gaoriel KolKO, one of the foremost proponents of 
tnis line of reasoning, sees Arnerican involvement in Vietnam 
as motivated in pact by tne desire to set Vietnam up as a 
test case for other Thira \<lorla nations: 
That liietnam itself has relatively little of value to 
tne United 3tat~3 is all the more significant as an 
example of America's determination to hold the line as 
a IJlatter of princi}>.Le agains'c rc:volutiooary lJ10Vements. 
I-[hat is at stake, accordiag to t!1e "domino ll theory with 
wnich ~iashington accurately perceives trle wor'ld, is tne 
control of Vietnam's nelgllbors, Southeast Asia and, 
ultimatelJ, Latin America.1J 
.(olkO argues that Vletnam waS vital not so much oecause of 
its economic resources as in terms of its utility to the 
Unitea States as a demonstration of the credioility ana 
e;ravi ty of the .1met'ican corruni tment to the maintenance of its 
own dOlJlinant power in Lhe world. The ul ti!l!ci te iJJ1pera ti ve of' 
American intervention is, accordine; to KolKO, the 
pr~servation of American capir,alism as the leadin6 political 
and economic system; in reference to tnis goal, Vietnam 
served as a \'larnlng of the extent to. which the United States 
wou~d go to secure the position of this system. 
The role of credibility in the interpretation which sees 
ideology as tne force oehind American involvement is similar 
to tnis in that it encompasses both the ends and tile means to 
tne objectives of intervention. If Vietnam is viewed as an 
i:.ast Asian locus of tne Cold vial" ideoloiSical conflict, then 
it follows that the role of Vietnam would be to· demonstra..;e 
tne . preeminer1ce of tne American pation and system. Proving 
tne credioility of the American perspective is then a central 
policy goal, and is also a strategy for the achievement of 
the aim of staoilizing the power and influence of the 
American iaeological outlook. 
The quagmire theory and the sysc.em worked analysls 
involve a different type of crediDility: personal prestige 
witilin the government of the United States. Both 
interpretations point up the importance LO government 
bureaucrats of maintaining and enhancing pecsonal credibility 
ana the effects this COl1cern has to\-iara increasing t:o.e volume 
of deception and irrationality within the policy maKincS 
apparatus. The syster..! workea thesis furthers tnis theme in 
its aiscusslon of the impact of domestic political 
impe.catives on American i{H;ervention in Vietnam. This 
interpretation places hign priority on the sicSnificance to 
tl1e ;,>resldent of maintainiLlg personal prestige toward tne 
60al of reelection. In general, presidents and tneir 
advisors were concernea with building up the credioility of 
the Administration, in tne eyes of the world, Con6ress, and 
tl1e voters, in order to enhance its position toward handling 
tne exiz.;encies of partisan and legislative poE tics. 
Hannah Arenat analyzes American involvement in Vietnam 
largely in terms of the issues of credibility and deception. 
She dlscusses two types of deception that are prevalent 
within the policy making bureau0racy: "image-ma.t<:ing" along, 
public relations lines, an<.1 decisio11 making meti10ds that 
tendeu to;,-lard t~le developmedt of laws anG "Gheories as a means 
to polley making. Arendt argues that these factors enaoleu 
decision ma~ers to design policies and strate3ies without 
regard to the ultimate and human reality of intervention in 
-vietnam. Arendt sees Amecican 60alsin Vietnam as equally 
00undw issues of creJibili ty and irilage, an,," therefore 
equally divorced from factual reality. She argues that there 
was no need, from the policy maker's perspective, to confront 
the facts in Vietnam, because Vietnam was only seen as a 
domino, a test case, or a means to demonstrating ~merican 
credibility regarding containment and the position of the 
1:1 
United States in ti18 world. 
Ii? 
Tnere are thus certain continuities among these 
different analyses whicn point up the difficulty of 
completely aaherin~ to or discardlng anyone of them. While 
not all of tnese im:.erpretatiol1s have -applications to the 
i>eriod 'I ;;4,:> to "19:>G, tney provide a framewor.< for analyzing 
t.ne original commitment. in the context of the ·course of 
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CHAPTER II 
Al'IERICAN "i'JEUTRALITl," 1945 - 194'7 
In August of 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt met WiL~ 
Winston Churchill off the coast of Ne .. foundland. On August 
12 they signed a broad declaration of common aims and 
principles, 
principles 
the Atlantic Charter. Central among these 
were a commitment to oppose any type of 
territorial expansionism, the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under w:1ich they will live, and tile 
cOnLmitment to see that self-government is restored to all 
peoples denied this by force. 
The Cnarter had concrete applications in the context of 
German expansionism at the time; as it was a general 
statement, it would stand as American policy in the postwar 
world. The signing of the Charter complicated the American 
approach to itlestern colonialism. Specifically, the 
commitment to national self-determination raised the problem 
of what position the United States should take in the event 
that the Western European powers attempted to reestablish or 
maintain control of Lheir colonial possessions in Asia. 
TOis issue was first brought to t11e fore in 1943, in 
discussions involving the war effort in French Indochina, 
which Japan had invaded in 1940. France ,-ia s against the use 
of Chinese troops in Indochina, warning that French troops 
might react against the Chinese, because they might see a 
Chinese attack as directed toward motives of self-interest as 
opposed to the Allied effort. The United States government, 
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nowever, viewed ttlis as a problem to be handled by the 
military in Indochina, but it was becoming apparent that more 
was involved. Assistant Secretary of State Berle noted this 
on October 21, 1943, and pointed out that the issue had to be 
considered: 
This brings us squarely up to the problem of whether, in 
the Far East, we are reestablishing the western colonial 
empires or whether we are letting the East liberate 
itself if it can do so. I feel that this matter should' 
be discussed on a high level with the President for his 
decision. 1 
President Roosevelt had strong feelings about European 
colonialism. He saw colonialism as a central cause of 
Japanese aggression in East Asia, and looked toward 
trusteeship for these colonies under the auspices of the 
2 
United Nations Organization to be formed after the war. 
Dur ing the .. /aI", Roosevelt brought up the possibility of an 
international trusteeShip for Indochina at the Tehran 
Conference. The goal of suc~ an arrangement would oe to 
prepare the people for self-government within a twenty to 
thirty year period. At Tehran FDR received complete 
3 
agreement from' Stalin and Chiang Kai-ahek on the issue.> 
This did not, represent a final decision. Rather, American 
wartime policy regarding Indochina was characterized by 
indecision. 
Tnis is seen in the conflicting messages which tne 
United States conveyed. On the one hand FDR began to commit 
the United States to trusteeship for Indochina; on the other, 
the United States was deeply co~nitted to France and Britain, 
each of which held colonial possessions in East Asia. The 
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United States had made a number of statements datin3 back to 
1941 reassuring France of American support for the 
reestaDlishment of French sovereignty over its colonies aft-er 
it 
the war. Therefore, when FDR began to advocate 
international trusteeship for Indochina, the British became 
concerned because of the implications this would have on 
their own colonial possessions in Asia. In January 1944, FDR 
informed Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the United 
States, that it was his opinion that Indochina should be 
administered by an international trusteeship. In reporting 
this to. Secretary of State Hull, Roosevelt stated that 
As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly 
supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
and DJ Harshal Stalin. I see no reason to play in with 
the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only 
reason they seem to oppose it is that taey fear the 
effect it would have on their own possessions and those 
of the Dutch. Tney have never liKed the idea of 
trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at 
future independence. This is true in tile case of Indo-
Ctlina. 
Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, 
but the case of Indo-China is perfectly clear. France 
has :nilked it for one hundred years. Tne people of 
Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.5 
Roosavelt also strongly opposed the idea of using any French 
troops in the lioeration of Indochina. But he hesitated to 
present this as an official policy conclusion because of 
British sensitivity to anticolonialism. American policy 
throughout 1944 continued to be ambivalent and the U.S. 
declined from stating any definitive policy toward Indochina. 
Roosevelt continued to reaffirm his sentiments as expressed 
in the Atlantic Charter, but also naturally continued to 
support the Allies. In the face of growing British and 
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French concern over the contradictions in American policy for 
postwar Indochina, the United States chose to postpone the 
problem. As FDR told Secretary of State Stettinius on 
January 1, 1945: "I still do not want to get mixed up in any 
Indo-China decision. It is ,a matter for posblar •••• From both 
the military and civil point of view, action at this time is 
o 
premature." 
President Roosevelt again raised ttle issue of' 
trusteeship for Indochina at the Yalta Conference in 
February; once again Stalin agreed and Churchill opposed the 
idea. After Yalta pressures from France increased. In March 
De Gaulle told Jefferson Caffery, the United States 
ambassador in PariS, that the French did not understand 
American policy: 
Verj 
'Wnat are you driving at? Do you want us to 
become ••• one of the federated states under the RUssian 
aegis? •• If the public here comes to realize that you 
are against us in Indo China there will be terrific 
disappointment and nobody knows to what that will lead. 
We do not want to become Communist; we do not want to 
fall into the Russian orbit, but I hope that you do not 
push us into it. ''I 
shortly after Caffery reported this conversation, 
President Roosevelt seelllS to have modified his opinion 
concerning Indochina. On Harcl1 15, FuR said he would ac;ree 
to France's retention of Indochina with the stipulation that 
8 
independence was the ultimate goal. His policy still of 
course excluded unconditional reestablishment of FrenCh 
control, but Roosevelt was moving away from his adherence to 
the idea of U.N. trusteeship due to British and French 
opposition. 
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FDR's changing policy devolved to an abandonement of the 
trusteeship proposal in favor of allowinb France to determine 
the future of Indochina. In a statement on April 3, approved 
by the President, Secretary of State Stettinius an!10unced 
that as a result of the discussions at Yalta, the United 
states looKed to trusteeship as applicable to "territories 
taken from the enemyll and "sucl1 otr1ec territories as might 
voluntarily be placed under trusteeship." ;'ii th Indochina 
fitting into the latter cate,gory, it was really up to France 
9 
to decide upon tilt;} status of Indochina. 
American ;.>olicy Has still so;ne~mat ambi6uous at ti1e time 
of Roosevelt's death on April 12. Upon Harry S. Tr'uman I s 
accession to th'~ presidency, foreign policy perspectives 
cnanged rapidly. Certain themes of the considerations of 
Indochina policy during the Roosevelt Administration WOUld, 
howeVer, prevail under Truman. These include mainly the 
conflict between the need to support france as a i'lestern 
pO'fler and the American commitment to anticolonialism, and ti1e 
furtherence of the attempt to let France determine the future 
status of Indochina in order that the United States could 
stay out of the conflict. 
Truruan nad very little previous knowled5 e of the 
worKings ot foreiln policy upon Roosevelt's death. He had 
never been briefed on contemporary issues, nor had FDR 
informed Truman about his personal approach. This was 
especially significant in terms of relations with the SOViet 
Union. FDR had used a some\"hat bilateral approach in that 
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while his public statements "#ere of a universalist nature, he 
approached his personal contacts with Stalin from a more 
1') 
realpolitik perspective. Una,.;are of the intricacies of 
Roosevelt's diplomacy, Truman would approach foreign policy 
from a universalist, black vs. white standpoint. He also in 
general assumea a stance of toughness, in part due to his 
sense of need to assert his authority as tile non-elected heir 
to the presidency. Because of his relative naivete, Truman 
relied heavily on his advisors in matters of foreign policy, 
in contrast to FDRts highly personal approach. These aspects 
of t.he early period of Tru.'llan I s presidency would have serious 
effects on the direction of diplomacy in the imminent Cold 
War with the Soviet Union. 
On the day after FDR's death, Trw'llan requested an 
o~tline of the principal issues in foreign policy from 
secretary Stettinius. Regarding France, Stettinius reported 
that "the best interests of the Uuitea St.ates require that 
every effort be uade by this Government to assist France, 
morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her 
influence,ff He continued to state that tne French were then 
nighly preoccupied with national prestige, and 
They have consequently from time to time put fori .. ard 
requests which are out. of all proportion to their 
present strength and have in certain cases, notably in 
connection with Indochina, showed [sic) unreasonable 
suspicions of American aims and motives. It is believed 
that it is in the interest of the United States to take 
full account of this psychological factor in the French 
mind and to treat France in all respects on the basis of 
her potential pONer and influence rather than on the 
basis of tler present strength.11 
This overriding concern with strengthening France was a prime 
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motive behind United States policy tOrlard Indocil.ina, the 
result of wnich was a Shift in focus from FDR's 
anticolonialism a!:ld the trusteesnip concept to policies whicn 
would nelp to strangthen 'tlestern Europe psychologically, 
economically, and militarily vis a vis the Soviet Union. 
Shortly after Truraan was sworn in, the State Department 
conducted a revie\.; of policy toward Indocnina. While the 
resultant document was never given to President Truman, tue 
drafts drawn up by the Far Eastern Affairs (FE) and European 
Affairs (BUR) desks of the State Department are significant 
for tr1eir revelation of attitudes and opinions. about the 
direction of Indochina policy_ 
The EUR drart noted S~ettinius' statement of April 3 and 
asserted that there was Ifnot the slightest possibility" that 
r'rance would volunteer to give control of Indochina over to 
an international trusteeship. It went on to say that if 
pressure were applied to France in tois context, it would 
haVe to De t.hrough unilateral action by the United States, 
since the ot.t'1er colonial powers would support France. It 
also pointed out that such a policy would contradict the 
"established America!} policy of aiding france to re2;ain her 
strength in order that she may be better fitted to share 
respon$ibility in maintaining the peace of Europe and the 
world. II The draft concluded that the U.S. sho:..:ld not oppose 
the restoration of French sovereignty over Indochina unless 
it was prepared to take similar action to I.,drd thi~ other 
colonial powers; rather, the U.S. should try to influence 
12 
france toward liberalizing its policies in Indochina. 
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In response to this, the FE division redrafted the BUR 
memoranduffi with SOille modifications. FE was in agreeillent with 
EUR that the U.S. should not oppose the reestablishment of 
French control in Indochina, but recommended a conditional 
offer of compliance that would guarantee some degree of self-
13 
These drafts illustrate the predominant view 
within the State Departnent. Roosevelt's concept of 
international trusteeship was discarded and policy cllOices 
tended away from the consideration of ultimate independence 
for Indochina. Rat.ner, the proposed racommendations were for 
SOlle measure of self-government under French auspices or 
tryin6 to influence France tOward this. Potential ~Derican 
policy choices were constrained by the fear of alienating 
France and. the otner i:estern Allies. 
Very soon after Truman came into office, then, there waS 
a definite shift in Indochina policy toward recognition and 
support of Frencn control over the area upon the conclusion 
of the war. At the United Nations Conference in San 
Francisco in late April 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes 
reassured the Fr.::nch tha t thl:l U. S. did not in any way 
1-4 
question Frenc11· sovereignty over Indoc~lina. 
But this policy shift did not affect American military 
actions in Indochina. In the su~er of 1945, tne Office of 
Strategil..! Services (OSS), precursor to the CIA, sent teams of 
North Vietna.m to work ostensibly with French and VietnaJ1El3e 
troo~s in guerrilla operations against Japan. but the 
Vietnamese had refused to collaborate with Frencn troops, so 
th~ Americans worked exclusively with tCle iJiet Hinh, as tney 
constitut~d the only effective guerrilla gorup in the area. 
Rela tions became quite war,n and the OSS teams developed 
sUbstantial respect and esteem for Ho and the Viet Hinh. 
Tney also saw the Viet Hin..~ as a widely supported popular 
movement. After the DRV had proclaimed independence, Hajor 
Allison K. Tnomas, a leader of the ass "Deer" mission, 
reported that new govermnent seems to be 
enthusiastically supported by the majority of the p09ulation 
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in every province of Indoc[lina." Overall, Tho~as' report 
illustrates tile positive response of the ass teams w their 
close w;)rKings witn the Viet i'iinh. 
Consiceration of the status of Indochina nas been 
dra~naticallj 3.cceleratea DJ the Japanese surrender on August 
1~, 194:), after the atomic bombs were dpopped on HirOSHima 
aml Nagasa.c<i on August 6 and~, respectively. The decision 
to use the bomb, aside from increasing tile mounting strains 
oetween tne United States and the Soviet Union, found France 
sornawhat unprepared to recover control in Indochina. The 
French were also upset by their relative impotence in that 
British ana Chinese troops would be used to liberate 
Indochina from Japan. 
the Viet Hinh, however, had been prepared for 
mobilization almost immediately upon the end of the wap in 
the Pacific. Tney had succeeded in baining effective control 
OJ the end of August. Bao Dai abdica teo on Augus t; 30, aI1Ci 
the Democratic RepUblic of Vietnam was established on 
27 
September 2. Througnout this period and subsequent months, 
Ho Chi i'hnh looKed to the United States for support and aid. 
Ho's desire for American recognition and assistance was 
douotless part of the reason for his war~ receptio~ of the 
ass teams. Acco:-ding to Najor Archimedes Patti, Director of 
ti'18 ass in Hanoi at the time ,Ho was able to use the tlDeerll 
mission as a Iffantastic Psyc~10logical factortl to convince 
rival parties that his party had American backing and should 
therefore be tile. one to formulate the provisional government. 
Th~se rumors of A~erican support were widely Circulated, and 
affected Bao Dai's decision to abdicate to the "American-
16 
cio hoped to be aole to utilize such pronouncements of 
the iLi,erican camilli t;nent to anticolonialism as the Atlantic 
Cnarter to enhance his position. In a conversation with 
~·fajor ?atti, cio expressed his i'lOpe that the United States 
would cont.inue to cO::1demn colonialism in Indochina. concern 
that the U.S. would continue to condemn colonialism in 
Indochina. Ha also told Patti that he wanted to dispel tile 
notioD. that he was an agent of the CO;llintern, callin6 !:1irr.self 
a Hprobcessi ve-sociJ.list-a::.. tionalist, It and emphasized aoo\re 
11 
all his nationalisD. 
bo Coi ~'iinrl also aimeJ at t'eceivin.s sOrne U.S. support 
ti1rO..lLn the 1)rll/ Declaration of Independence, dr'aftad oy Ho in 
tne five days prior to Inue)endence Daj, SepteEloer 2. Tne 
Declaration bega..'1 with tne words: H~e hol~ truths tnat all 
men are created equal, t:1at trlej are endowed by their Creatoc 
~ith certain unalienable Rights, among the38 are Life, 
Lioerty and ti1e pursuit of HappinC!ss." 'I'ne Deolara"Gion al.::;o 
included an appeal to the Allie3 in 3ener8ol: "J.1e are 
COrlvinced tnat the Allies who have recog~ized the principles 
of equality of peoples at the Conferences of Te~h::ran and San 
i·'rancisco cannot but recobnize the Independence of Viet 
10 
dam. II Also, in a speech made directly after Ho read tne 
Declaration . of Independence on Septeffioer 2, Vo Nguyen Giap 
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appealed directly to the Allies not to aoal1don Vietnam. 
Tile United States becaIne aware of the DH,f's independence 
soon after September 2. American polioyJuakers klere also made 
aware of the s8r'iousness of the situation in IndochL:1a. T[le 
United States did not officially respond to the existence of 
tHe VietnarJese government until October 5, at wbicll paint 
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acileson made the following 
st:itement to American officials in East Asia conCernit16 
A;r.erican policy toward Indochina: 
US has no thought of oPposin6 the r8estaolishrnent 
of french control in IndoChina and no official statement 
by u.3 Govt has questioned even by implication Freilch 
sovereignty over IndoChina. However, it is not 'the 
policy of this Govt to assist the French to reestablish 
their control over Indochina' by force and the 
willingness 01' the US to see French control 
reestablished assu~es that French claim to have the 
support of the population of Indochina is borne out by 
futUre events.20 
This statement vlould, in various forL1s, constitute the (usia 
of American official policy toward Indochina until 1949. 
This was a policy of non involvement -- f1 i l eutrality" in toat 
the U.S. did not want to become directly involved frenco 
claims to sovereignty over Indochina. The United States 
would urge France to liberalize its policies. toward the 
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native population, but eS$entially abandoned its earlier 
insistence on guarantees of eventual independence for 
1n10c[11n::1 • 
Because of tne desire to stay out of the conflict, the 
u.s. did not recognize the' DRV or its appeals for American 
support. Between October 17, 1945, and February 16, 1946,Ho 
Chi Hin11 sent a series of communications to President Truman 
and Secretary of State Byrnes, and also to the heads of state 
of the oti1er .sreat powers. 
Tne first of these was a telegram to Trurllan on October 
1'7, at whic~l point nostilities had oeen taking place for some 
w~e!.<s between French anJ Vietn::1mese forces in South Vietnam. 
Ho brougnt to Truman's attentio:1 both the de jure and' de 
facto legitimacy of tile DRV Provisional Governrnent. He 
invo~ed the Atlantic Charter and this national legiti~acy as 
qualifications for Vietnamese representation on the United 
Hations Far East Advisory Commission in place of the French, 
who were in the commission as the representatives of 
21 
Indochina. 
The neAt of do's communications was a letter to :ayrnes 
of October 22, 1945, with whicn he enclosed the DRV 
Declaration of Independence, the rescript of Bao Dai's 
abdication, a declaration of DRV foreign policy, and an 
explanation of tbe vRV position on the war in South Vietnam. 
Ho again the French betrayal of Lhe Allies in iiorldWar II, 
and tbe conclusion of the Atlantic Charter, which Ho said was 
vieHed by the Viet Ninh as lithe foundation of future 
Vietnam. " He also ci ted the U. N. ci1at'ter, and as~ed for 
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reco6nition and intervention by tile United Nations. 
Ho continued to send cOIllillunica tions to the u.s., 
requesting American ana U.N. aid to figh-t starvation, and toe 
establishment of cultural relations betHeen the U.S. and 
Vietnam. He also continued to invoke the Atlant.ic and San 
Francisco Charters and appeal for recognition by the U.S. and 
otber great powBrs, and reiterated the nefarious deeds and 
intents of the French in collaborating "lit.h Germany and Japan 
and the the Vietnamese effort with the Allies a3ainst Japan. 
Ho cited in aadition President Truman's Navy Day speech of 
October 27, 1945 as .indicative of the American position 
toward to national self-deterltlina tion. 
This speech, 1tlhi1e never referring specif1.cally to 
Indochina, included a number of broad statements of American 
foreign policy goals, directed mainly toward the Sovi':!t 
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Union. Among the principles set dO"l-m by Truman H~re the 
A:nerican belief in "the eventual return of sO\lf~reign rights 
and salf-government to all peoples who have been deprived of 
them by force" and a pledge that the United States would 
1l1~efuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation 
2'4 
by the force of any fore ign ;>ower. II Clearly, Trilinan's 
reaffirmation of the Pr'ill::!iples of the Atlantic and U.N. 
Cnarters could be used oy Ho to gain lever'age ovar the 
Amerlean position. 
The United States never in any way responded to Ho's 
appeals. When Major Patti inquired at the State Department 
as to whether the U.S. had acknowleaged or was planning to 
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acknowledge receipt of the couwunications, he was informed 
tha t .because the U. S. did not recognize the DRV government, 
it would be "improper tl for anyone in authority to respond to 
Ho. He was also told that the U.S. was "colll.mitted" to look 
to France, and not the Vietnamese nationalists, for actions 
25 
toward Vietnamese independence. The American refusal to 
aCKnQwledge Ho's letters and telegrams explains the tone of 
cio's last letter to President Truman of Febru3.ry 16, 1946, in 
'Hilich he said tna t Frencn aggression in Vietnam I! i:npliea the 
com;>1icity, or at least, the connivance of the Great 
Democracies. I! Ho continued to push for aid,stating that 
lithe United Nations ought to keep their worda ll inpeace-tirne 
as well as in wartime, and cited the example of the 
independence granted the Philippines by the U.S. as the 
20 
CO:.lrse the Vietnamese wished to follow. 
But by this tL~e it was even less liKely that the U.S. 
·would extena aid or rec ogni tion to Ho. The DRV was already 
negotiating with France, encouraged oy the potential for 
support from the growing strength of the French Communist 
Part.y; this, conversely, motivated ti:Je U.S. to increase its 
support of Frarlce to avert ttle threat of tne government 
2'7 
falling into the hands of the communists. 
Still, through this period, American support of france 
was restrained by the overriding &~erican concern with 
re:naining "neutral." The United States was reluctant to 
support French colonialism but also did not want to alienate 
the FrenCh. This policy not only disappointed Vietnamese 
hopes for A~erican support but disappointed French 
expectations as well, in that France had hoped for more 
direct support from the U.S. The i:nperative to S!lOre up 
France as a major po~er in Western Europe became more vital 
to United States interests as Cold War tensions began to 
mount. Tne U.S. would continue to be critical of French 
policy in indochina, but the priority to create a strong 
bulwark against the perceived Soviet threat to the European 
balance of power 'tIould far outwei6h tile American anti-
imperialist co~~itment. 
This prior'i'cy was intensified upon the receipt in the 
State Department of George F. Ken::lan's loag telegram from 
Moscow on Feoruary 22, 1946. Kennan was one of the foreillost 
American experts on theSoviet Union, and had by this 'time 
built a strong career as diplomat and advisor. He also had a 
particularly veheillent anti-Soviet viewpoint. The telegram 
included an analysis of Soviet behavior and reco;;;mendations 
for A7<ierican policy in light of this analysis. The 
fundamental point of Kennan's analysis of the Soviet 
perspective was that Soviet hostility in foreign affairs was 
t3e result of the need perceived a~ong Soviet leaders to 
justify their approacrl toward domestiC affairs~ Kennan sail 
co:nnlUnism as a means for advancing this perspective ;nore than 
creating it. 
In his recoITuueadations for American policy, Kennan 
3ugge.3ted that the best way to approac11 Soviet paranOia and 
hostility vIas through realpolitik. His emphasis WdS on 
ouilding up security rather than attemptin~ to eradicate the 
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Soviet threat through confrontation. This implied a 
globalist outlook, in that Kennan anticipated covert Soviet 
policy on a globdl scale. He predictea that the Soviet Union 
would maKe "particularly violent effor4.:3 11 of a subterranean 
nature "to weaken pO;ter and influence of IIestern Po .... ers on 
colonial backward, or dependent peoples." rie foresa~ that 
the Soviet;; Union ',>IOuld a3itate resentments among dependeat 
peoples, and that while these peoples were flbeing encouraged 
to seek .independence of western Powers, Soviet dominated 
pu~pet ~olitical machines will be under30ia3 preparation to 
take over domestic pO'.-ler in respective colonial areas when 
independence is achieved." Hence the taSK for the U.S., as 
Kennan envisioned it, was to provide guidance and a positive 
e..{ample for other !13. tions, and above all to pro;:lOte tnelr 
?n _0 
security_ 
Kennan's message had an i[;unedia teL:,pact on the AlJ'.er iean 
forei~n policy outlOOK. It eillphasizad the i;upor-tance of t.he 
A:::nerica."l role throughout tile world in acting to tne control 
Soviet ex~atisionism. Tne U.S. be6an to formulate poliCies 
Wi1icn were global in sco,iJe, and would therefore impact local 
polici~3 as well. Policy planning toward Indochina, in part 
as a result of Kennan's projections concernin& Soviet policy 
toward Western colonial areas, be6an to reflect this 
apprehension of Soviet global policy and the 3rowing ~lerican 
tendency toward a global outlook. 
~s glooalism grew, so grew the perception of Dipolarity 
in the world. A::nerican ties to the h'estern Allies were 
fort.ified in the face of greater strains oeti/een the United 
St~tes and the Soviet Lnio~. The . East-llest split was 
accelerated by Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain ti speech of 
Narch 5, 1946 in Fulton, Missouri. . Despite President 
Truman's claim that ne h3.d. not been aware of what the message 
of t.ne former Prime Minister "5 speech would be befor",,,a~lJ, 
his presence on the dais gave the appearance of American 
concurrance "(.Jith Cnurchill's position. The effect was that 
the speech · ... as interpreted by many as a statement of tile 
Anglo-Arne:rican outlooic. The speech would have Significant 
interL1ational and domestic repercussions. Churchill 
essentially equated Soviet do,-oestic policy and foreign policy 
Objectives with those of anotner totalitarian state, Nazi 
Germany, and had. an obvious impact less tilan a year 
after the conclusion of World \.Jar II. He also warned of the 
presence in France and most other natio~s of XOSco"-l-oriented 
oom:nunist l1fiftn colu:nns" which constituted, he asserted, "a 
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gro~ing cballenS8 and peril to Christian civilization." 
'1\18 day after Churcnill's speech, France and Vietnam 
agreeJto a preliminary accord. Difficult negotiations had 
been initiated as a result of Vietnamese apprehension due to 
the asreement between Cnina and FrancB in February 1945 
allowing French troops to replace ChinesB occupation troops 
in North Vietnam. Apparently, the DliV felt that they might 
effectively buy soene time through negotiating to pCBpare for 
jO 
the struggle with France. Because of the French refusal to 
use the 'word "independence II in the document, the Republic of 
Vietnam \,as recognized by France in the agreement as an 
3';) 
ill. ; up 
31 
ambiguo:.lS "free. state l1 Hithin the French Union. 
Practically speaKing, this accord did not produce any change 
in the status of the DRV, but Ho felt pressured in that he 
had quite narrow options ste~ing fro~ his failure to secure 
any aS$istance whatsoever froili the United States antl ti1cl U.N. 
Ti.1US Ho continued to negotiate witn France through Septe;;:ber 
191.,16 in order to gain the necessary peace-ti;ne to build up 
ti,le !)olitical, military, and economic strength of ti18 DRV. 
In the meantime, the United States perpetuated the 
policy of non involvement beyond vocal support of France. On 
April 12, Secretary of State Byrnes informed the French 
amo;lssador to the U.S., Henri Bonnet, that the United St;ltes 
approved the replacement of Chinese forces with French troops 
in northern Indochina; in accord with the policy of 
"neutrality," thj.s '.-las viewed as lIa matter for determination 
by the G'Jver.:1:n.ents of France and China." iind, in accord with 
the dBsire to strengtD8n American rela~ions with France, 
.3yrnes' note :n.entioned ti1at the Sino-Frenca agreeillent. 
ttcompletes the reversion of all Indo-China to FrenCi1 
control.!1 Tnus t11e U.S. i!'liplicitly supported this reversion, 
despite the fact tha.t it contradicted of· the Franco-
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lJietna:B.ese agreement of i'iarCi:1 6, which WaS not mentio!1ed. 
Yet througnout 1346, American officials continued to 
voice concern over French :notives and policies in intern3.1 
cOiU.:nunica tion s. As Frantio-Vietnamese nezotiations at the 
Dalat Conference in A~ril and l"iay progressed with difficulty, 
til,:;: U • ..3. Consul at Saigon, Cnarles Reed, reported that: 
French insistence l-iitharawal Chinese from north and 
3b 
all-over procrastination to Dalat may have ulterior 
motives as it is not impossible French military coup may 
q beoroue;ht off as soon as Chinese gone. Some Frencb 
civilians have spoKen of this lias putting Viatnaillese in 
their place. 1I In any event over-all picture is not 
happy one and much comproruis8t good faith and tolerance 
needea to effect peaceful settlemen~.3j 
Similarly, during the next Franco-Vietnamese 
negotiations at Fontainebleau betwaen July and September, 
A000t L. Hoffat, tue Chief' of the State Department's 
Soutrleast Asian Affairs desk (St;A) , reported his suspicions 
about French motives and (supported) the Vietnamese claim 
that France was not living up to the agreement of March r o. 
Noffat assarted t.har. tL1e Frenc:n were moving to ree;ain control 
of Indochina "in violatio:1 of the spirit of the Harch 6 
cO:lventio:1,lt and felt that since Vietnamese resistanoe Has 
li..:ely, the ultimate result could very well be widespread 
hostilities. He also reported that the French might be 
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preparing to secure cO:1trol through a resort to force. The 
result of tt1e Fontainebleau Conference was the modus vivendi 
or Septe:uber 14, :,[hicn, while it didn I t settle the most 
crucial issue of the status of Cochinchina, reiterat.ed the 
iD~ortance of perpetuating the spirit of tbe Marcn 0 
preliminary and anticipated continuation of 
negotiat.ions in January 1941. 
while &'1erican officials were quite critical of French 
pollcy and actions in Indocnina, the Cold \~-ar foreign policy 
perspective was heading increasingly in directions which 
would SOO:1 lead to stronger efforts to shore u~ France in 
both ~urope and Southeast Asia. On Septemoer 24, 1946 Clark 
Clifford, Special Counsel to th2 President, reported to 
Truman on United States relations with the Soviet Union. 
While never circulated outside the White House, Clifford IS 
report is important in that, building on the'foundation of 
Kennan's "Long Telegram," it recommended policies which would 
gain more currency as the Cold War accelerated. Among the 
more significant suggestions Clifford made was that the U.S. 
should "support and assist all democratic countries which are 
in any way menaced or endangered by the U.S.S.R." He 
recommended economic rather than milital~y support in that 
this would strengthen ties with friendly nations and would 
also effectively demonstrate "that capitalism is at least the 
equal of communism." Clifford also stated that U. S. pOlicies 
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must be global in scope. The report illustrates the growth 
even at this early date of the tendency to view the world in 
bipolar terms. 
This viewpoint increased American concern with Ho Chi 
Minh's communist affiliations. In the fall of 1946, the 
French claimed to have proof that Ho was receiving direct 
instructions from Moscow. also alleged 
connections between the DRV and Chinese communists, but none 
of this was verified. At this point serious clashes had 
broken out between France and Vietnam, and Americans again 
questioned France's intentions, in this case in reference to 
Ho's t-1oscow connections. James 0 I Sulli van, the American Vice 
Consul at Hanoi, reported that "French concern over Communism 
may well be devised to divert Dept's attention from French 
36 
policy in Indochina." 
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But regardless of their doubts about Fl'ance, American 
policy makers became concerned with their allagations. In 
instructions to S:::A Chief Hofrat, wilo ;'/as going to Banoi, 
Acting Secretary of state Acheson cautioned 11in1 to 
Keep in mine Ho's clear record as agent 
international communism, absence evidence recantation 
Moscow affiliations, cohfused political situation France 
and support Ho receiving Frencn COillillunist Party. Least 
dasirable eventuality \iould ba establishment Comrnunist-
dominated, Moscow-oriented state Indochina in vieH DEPT, 
which most interested INFO strength non-comrnunist 
elements Vietnam.37 
After Visiting Ho, Hoffat reportea that Ho indicated :lis 
government WdS first and foremost a nationalist group_ 
1:;0 f f'a t said tilis went along l-lith the well-informed French 
vie'ri Ho' s group was interested in building up an effective 
nationalist state first as a prerequisite to the s,;::comiary 
jb 
aim of building a COfnfnunist state. In reporting Noffat's 
view to the London, Noscow, and i~aokin5 t-lissions, Secre-cary 
Byrnes stated that, apart fro:n ti1e strength of Vietnamese 
nationalism and anti-French sentiment, "Frenci1 influence is 
iDportant not only as an antidote to Soviet influence but to 
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protect Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imper'ialism." 
Tois indicates the relatively 11i61:1 priority given to France 
in Allier ican .~ational security concerns. 
American policy tOl4ard Indochina after the outbreax: of 
the Franco-Vietnamese tiar on December 19, 1':;145 increaSingly 
reflected this ran~ing of priorities. On December 30, Consul 
Heed reported to the Secretary of State that the FrenCh :night 
De willing to negotiate witn Vietnam, but needed to find 
so;nedne with wnom to treat without "losing face." Reed 
sUi;Sgest.ed "creatio:::1 new VietnaUl Government," perhaps lL:lder 
former emperor Bao Dai, with which France could deal without 
ellibarrassme:::1t and which could exert influence over ci~ native 
40 
po;mlatio!l. This is a relatively early suggestion of t.he 
idea of supplantin~ the existing "extremist" Vietnamese 
government with one more compatible to french and American 
interests. 
Tne year 1947 sa~ crucial snifts in the American foreign 
policy outlook, out as of February 3, Indocilina policy was 
esswltially the same. In the first policy statement made OJ 
tne new Secretary of State George C. l'1arsi1all on this day, 
the illain tbe:ne3 found in InJoc~:ina policy since the Hal" years 
were basically reiteratea. £1arS11311 reaffirmed tlle A:lierican 
concerD with strengthening France: "we are anxious in every 
way Wi;; can to sU":>rlort Fra,1ce in hal" fight to regain ner 
e:!ono:nlc, polit.ical anJ. lflilitary strength and to restore 
herself as in fact one of G:ajor po';;ers of world. II He also 
r~affirillea United states recognition of France soverei6nty. 
L'larS!1a 11 also brou&'1t up tIle knerican policy of 
ant.icolonialism, pointins out that France persisted in the 
usa of a "dan6erously outmoJed colonial outlook and methOdS," 
and tiL3.t niC1eteenti:l ce"turj style colon.ial empires were a 
Tyin.g in another strand of previous U.S. 
policy toward Inaochina, i'larshall notec. no's cO:l:8unis t 
affiJ..i:itions and e',npnasiz,;;d that I"l'ie aeB not interested in 
oolonial em9ire administrations supiJlanteG Df 
)hiloSopUj and political organizations emanating froill ana 
controlled by Kremlin." Marshall also ~ade note of the 
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rising globalism in American foreign policy by statin6 that 
the situation in Indochina could no longer be viewed as of a 
local character. Secretary of State Harshall concluded by 
reaffirming tna policy of non-involvement: "Frankly we na· ... e 
no solution of proble8 to suggest. It is basically matter 
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for two parties to work out th,,,mselves." 
Marshall' 03 appointment as Secretary of State brings 1.1.;) 
nis earli.::r role as iliediator oetween the nationalists and 
commu:lists in China. A:nericatl ;:Jolicy towat"d Cnina WOJlc haVE:: 
a very stron~ impdct on Indocnina policy in 1~q9. riuile tfle 
effects Here not yet felt in 194"7, tnt courSd of ilrnecican 
involvement .in China up to this point is relevant in terms of 
the similarities between the two conflicts. 
Tne stated A:nerican goal in China after Horld ~iar II .... -as 
ttle qreation of a unifiea, stable, and friendly state. 
Toward tnls end, the united :3tates sponsored negotiations 
oetro-ieen Chiang Kai-shek IS Ha tionalist government and '(ne 
Chinese COID.1lunists in 1945 and 1946. But the AOlerican 
effort at maaiation, first unaer Ambassador Patric~ J. 
riurl::!y, awl later WIder :.ieneral Harshall, \<las curtailed in 
October 1)46 fro ill frustra~ion and with the ~essimisti8 
preaictiml tnat Mao's ~rou9 ~ould inevita~ly gain control in 
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the foreseea01e future. 
statement that the Indochina 
conflict Has no longer to oe consiaered a local concera 
~ecame e3~ecially apt in February and March of 1941. 3ritain 
had been proviain6 SUbstantial militacy ana econo~ic aid to 
both Greeca anu Turkey in hopes of halting communist attempts 
to gain control in both nations. In Feoruary Britain 
informed the United States that it could no longer afford to 
support Turxey and Greece and \·lQuld have to vlithc1raw its 
troops ana terminate all aid to these countries in order to 
fortify its own unstable economy. The U.S. felt it crucial 
t-ha t the ll::ner ican govern:nent extend :nili Lary and econo::nic 
a.3::>i;:;tance to Greece and Tur~ey, but this entailed receivine; 
Congres3ional approval. Thus on i"larc:, 12 ?resident Truman 
adJ.re3sed a joint session of Congress to request :;;400 million 
in aid for the countries. Ti1is came to be :,(.nown a s the 
Tru:r.an i)octrine. 
The Hlessage of Truman I S speecn oonsti tuted a turnin.:;; 
point in A~erican forei~n ~olicy. The speeCh estaolisned 
glooalism as yolicy and definea American natio:nl security to 
be involved in any struggle WD0re aggression of any type 
threatened the peace. After presenting the critically 
u:::--.st.aole nature of t;he 3i tua tion in eact'. country in rather 
draDatic terms and stating that the U.S. was the only nation 
to ',-;hich Greeoeand Turkey could turn for muon needed 
support, Tru'Uan ciiscl.lssect ADerican foreign policy in general. 
He SLated tlle creation of conait:Lons ul1der vll1ich the U.S. and 
other countries could live "free frox coercion" as one of t~~ 
primary aims of Amerioan foreign policy. Ho~ever, Truman 
as.3ertec., He 'iQuld not be able to realize this goal "urlles.3 
we are willing to help free peoples to maint;ain their free 
institutions and their national inte~rity against aggressive 
move~nent::; that seek to impose upon them totalitarian 
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regimes." rIe continued that thE: direct or indirect 
imposition of totalitarianism would "undermine tile 
fO'-lndations of international peace and hence the securit.y of 
t:ne United States." 
Tr~nan stated that u.s. policy must be to support 
nations in resisting tnis kina of pressure, and that this 
should oe achieved primarily through economic aid. He also 
warneCl of ttle potential dane;er to neighboring co \1...'1 tries 
sho'-lld eit:ner Greece or Turj,:ey "fall under the control of an 
ar:ned minority." Truman stated that "Should ',.je fail 'to aid 
Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effec t will De 
far ceach~n5 to the ~~est as well as to the Eas"C. II rie 
concluded by asserting that the free nations of the gloDe 
100:.<eo to ttle U.S. for leadecship, anri that if t.he United 
States failed to take that responsibility, repercussions 
!t3 
wo~ld be felt not only in kilerica but throughout the world. 
Tbe Truman Doctrina speech was a turning point because 
it was a oefinite statement of American foreign policy goals 
and strat.egj. It essentially codified rlmerican anticommunist 
~lobalisc, sup~lementinl the outlook suggested oy Kennan in 
ttl", II long tel8brac,~H with universalist, riletoric. One ca.n 
speculate as to wnat extent tne stJeecn viaS mece rhet.oric and 
to extent it 'i-las actually believed OJ 
Administration. is little doubt. tha t the ill a in 
i!Llmediate objective of the adaress was to push Tru::Jan's 
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foreign aid programs thcough Congress. Thus the lofty 
rhetoric was employed as a means to gaiL1. CongresSiO!lal and 
pu~11c support for these costly programs. 
It is also clear that Truman himself had a fairly hard-
line vision of foreign policy, and wanted to take a "tough l1 
stance toward the Soviet Union. Before delivering tne 
speeci'l, the Presideat requesteci that it be reHrittea to 
include a statement of general policy, then revised it again 
himself in order to maKe the lanl:;,uage stronge:'! "I wanted no 
nedging in this speeoh. This ltlaS Ailierica' s ans-.Jer to the 
4:) 
surbe of expansion of Co!:nrnunist tyranny." ThUS rhetoric of 
tue sort used in the Atlantic Cnarter was e:J1ployed, this time 
directed toward tne threat of Soviet aggres3ion in p.::;ace-tble 
as o.Jposed to the aggression of the Axis powers during the 
'far. Tne declaration of policy in the Truman Doctrine speech 
su.:;gested that it was America I s role to protect the rigr1t to 
na tional self-determination in the faco::; of COmlTlUl1is t 
expanslonism, as distinct froiu the right to national self-
deto::;rm::..nation in general. ~Jha tever tne main purpose of the 
stJeech, and regardless of hOi" much American policy ma.<:ers 
actuallj believed in its message, the Truman Doctrine had tne 
illhliediate effect.s of heralding the COLl Hal' in t118 United 
Stdtes a('-1 disse:ninating aaticommunist ideology througnout 
t~1e American public. And, the effects of tnis policy 
attltude \tlOUld soon be felt in A:nerican local policy toward 
Indochina. 
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CHAPTER III 
FROM PERIPHERAL TO VITAL INTEREST, 1947 - 1950 
The universalism broadly pronounced in the Truman 
Doctrine speech was not immediately echoed in internal 
foreign policy discussions. This indicates that the Truman 
Doctrine was in fact designed mainly as a means to 
Congressional support for the aid proposal for Greece and 
Turkey, and not as an official statement of policy. Rather, 
policy makers concentrated at this point on setting 
priorities in terms of potential recipients of United States 
aid because it was plainly impossible to provide aid to the 
entire globe. 
An example of this is the report to the Joint Chiefs of 
April 29, 1947, by a Pentagon policy planning group, the 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee. Written relatively soon 
after President Truman's speech, the report emphasized that 
"the mere giving of assistance to other countries will not 
necessarily enhance the national security of the United 
States." The report pointed up the limits of American 
capabilities, and ranked possible recipients of aid in terms 
of areas of vital and peripheral interest to the national 
security of the United States. 
The report indicates the growth of bipolarity in the 
policy making outlook. It made recommendations in reference 
to the potentiality of "ideological warfare," and viewed the 
"primary r'ule!l governing American aid as the exclusion of 
aid to all countries under Soviet control. The 
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recommendation was to extend aid on the basis of importance 
to national security before urgency of need -- "excepting in 
those rare instances which present an opportunity for the 
United States to gain worldwide approbation by an act 
strikingly humanitarian." The report is thus much more 
pragmatic than the policy announced in the Truman Doctrine 
speech of assisting free peoples the world over, but it also 
indicates the prominence within the Pentagon at this early 
date of the viewpoint of a world divided into two camps. The 
Committee stressed the need to strengthen friendly nations in 
strategically vital areas in order to be prepared "in the 
1 
event of war with our ideological enemies." 
France was high on the list of areas of vital national 
interest. But French policy in Indochina was still viewed 
quite critically by State Department officials in Southeast 
Asia. The United States retained its neutrality in the 
Franco-Vietnamese War through 1947 but searched at the same 
time for possible alternatives and compromises to what 
appeared increasingly to be a policy planned toward the goal 
of returning Indochina to its prewar status on the part of 
France. In May, the Southeast Asia desk (SEA) tried to 
influence a more progressive policy outlook of urging France 
to negotiate with the DRV, the result of which was success in 
getting Secretary of state Marshall to send a telegram to 
Ambassador Caffery warning of the possible effects of a 
2 
French attempt to maintain control of Indochina. 
In these instructions to Caffery, Secretary Marshall 
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pointed out a fact which would be central to American policy 
making in the period: while policy makers were concerned 
with the direction of French strategy, they were very aware 
that any setbacks to French interests in Southeast Asia would 
be setbacks to American interests as well. Thu3 the United 
States would try to influence French policy but would not, 
all in all, be able to exert much pressure because of its 
dependence on the French to facilitate the aims of American 
policy without necessitating direct United States involvement 
in Indochina. Marshall warned in this connection of the 
possible repercussions of protracted war in Indochina: 
Plain. fact is that Western democratic system is on 
defensive in almost all emergent nations southern Asia 
and, because identified by peoples these nations with 
what they have considered former denial their rights, is 
particularly vulnerable to attacks by demagogic leaders 
political movements of either ultra-nationalist or 
Communist nature •••• Signs development anti-Western 
Asiatic consciousness already multiplying ••.• We fear 
continuation conflict may jeopardize position all 
Western democratic powers in southern Asia •••• 
Marshall suggested that Caffery express the American hope fop 
a concepted effopt by France towards ending.the war soon. 
Marshall's concern that the French desire to find more 
conCiliatory Vietnamese leaders with whom to negotiate would 
lead to the creation of a puppet government or the 
restoration of Bao Dai is quite signi.ficant; Secretary 
Marshall rejected the latter because it would imply 
"democracies reduced resort monarchy as weapon against 
3 
Communism." Thus the United states was concerned with 
building up strong democratic Western-oriented nations in 
Southeast Asia, but France was more interested in regaining 
colonial control of Indochina. 
American policy makers felt that the installation of a 
French puppet government and/or the restoration of the former 
emperor would definitely not be acceptable to the native 
4 
population. It was becoming increasingly clear that Ho Chi 
Minh was the only Vietnamese leader with extensive popular 
support in 1947, and the State Department therefore began 
considering the viability of unification under Ho from the 
standpoint of American national interests. On ,July 17, 
Marshall requested that Consuls Reed in Saigon and O'Sullivan 
in Hanoi appraise the likely repercussions upon American 
interests should France be forced to tr'eat with the DRV, 
5 
leading eventually to DRV control in all of Indochina. 
Thus Marshall was considering the viability of national 
communism as a solution in Indochina. The concept that a 
communist state could be free of Soviet domlnation challenges 
the bipolar view of the world advanced by the Pentagon. 
In their responses a few days later, both Reed and 
O'Sullivan expressed the belief that under these prospective 
circumstances, it was quite possible that Vietnam could exist 
independent of Soviet control. Both stressed the commitment 
among Vietnamese first and foremost to independence, and felt 
that the United States could exert influence if it were to 
extend aid to Vietnam. Reed and O'Sullivan contended that 
the primary sentiment among Vietnamese nationalists was anti-
French, and that the possibility of strong Soviet influence 
was unlikely, at least for quite some time. They asserted 
that Ho was a nationalist first, and would align his 
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government with whatever nation offered aid toward the goal 
of independence. Reed did point out, however, that there was 
no way of knowing exactly how influential ,Ho's communist 
affiliations would be once independence was achieved, whether 
facilitated by the United Statcs or not: "A wHy 
opportunist, Ho will take any aid coming his way to gain his 
6 
ends without disclosing ultimate intentions." 
The view that France would most likely have to deal with 
Ho eventually was reiterated by Chinese foreign ministry 
officials a few months later. Significantly, the Koumintang 
officials who spoke with American Ambassador Stuart voiced no 
serious concern with the possibility of a communist state on 
China's border, and rather strongly disagreed with the idea 
7 
of restoring Bao Dai. 
While the State Department was considering the 
possibility of a communist-directed government over 
Indochina, American foreign policy on the larger scale was 
meanwhile taking crucial steps toward the expressed goal of 
fortifying Western Europe against the spread of Soviet 
communism. It became increasingly apparent early in 1947 
that the economy of Western Europe was in critical shape, and 
the United Statesbegan to draw up plans for large scale 
economic aid for the Western Allies. The resultant program 
for assistance, the Marshall Plan, was pcopopsed for the 
first time by Secretary Marshall in a speech at the Harvard 
commencement on June 5. Marshall presented the grave 
condition of the European economy and the necessity for 
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extensive aid in order to prevent total economic, social, and 
political collapse. He then stated the clear humanitarian 
responsibility of the United States to suppor~ reconstruction 
in Europe in terms similar to those employed by President 
Truman in the Truman Doctrine speech: 
With 
Our policy is directed not against any country or 
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and 
chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social conditions in which free 
institutions can exist ••• governments, political parties, 
or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order 
to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will 
encounter the opposition of the United States.8 
this speech the United States began to work 
comprehensively toward European recovery. 
One of the most important foreign policy making bodies 
in this period was the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), formed by 
Secretary Marshall early in 1947. It was designed to create 
and develop long-range policy programs, and 1-1arhsall 
appointed George F. Kennan as its first director in May. 
Kennan's "long telegram" had created for him a reputatIon 
within the government as its foremost SovIet expert and a 
9 
very able and incisive strategist. Because of his position 
in the foreign policy establishment, Kennan published his 
article for Foreign Affairs, liThe Sources of Soviet Conduct, If 
under the pseudonym "Mr. X" 1n July, 1947. However, when the 
author's true identity was leaked, the article began to be 
taken by some as a statement of United States policy. This 
was unfortunate, as Kennan's analysis in the "X" article did 
not reflect the entirety of his thinking on the subject, nor 
did he intend it as a statement of official strategy. The 
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ultimate result would be confusion over Kennan's true 
perceptions due to contradictions and inconsistencies between 
the "XII article and the policies and str'utegies formulated by 
the Policy Planning Staff. 
Kennan used the term "containment" for the first tlme ln 
the Foreign Affalrs artlcle, which was lntended malnly as a 
public restatement of the analysls ln his "long telegram." 
Kennan argued that 
the main element of any United States policy toward the 
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patlent but 
firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive 
tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such 
a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: 
with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of 
outward "toughness." 
Kennan believed that Soviet pressure upon the West could be 
contained "by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-
force at a series of constantly shiftlng geographical and 
10 
political points." It can be seen, then, how this could 
produce confusion if taken as an official policy statement, 
in that the Administration's policy did not conform with the 
"X" article, nor did it employ "containment" as described in 
the article. 
The "X" article was quite significant because it brought 
the concept of containment into foreign policy considerations 
and into the public eye. Kennan's true perceptions about the 
implementation of containment can be clarified through 
examining some of the lnternal PPS studies he directed. For 
example, in a paper for Secretary Marshall on November 6, 
1947, Kennan emphasized that "our policy must be directed 
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toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia. 1I He 
stressed the use of economic assistance for the objective of 
containment, and pointed out that psychological and 
political factors were also important as means to restoring 
11 
the balance of world power. This is a different approach 
from that of the "X" article, which advocated a somewhat 
militant stance. Kennan did not suggest the use of military 
force in Foreign .Affairs -- he believed the Soviet Union did 
not intend to start a war --- but dtd favor a militant 
approach to the Cold War. Altogether, Kennan's concept of 
containment was approached from a realpolitik standpoint, and 
he recognized the limits of American power, something which 
was not so apparent in the "X" article. 
The policy of containment, although it would, over time, 
tend in different directions from Kennan's original idea, was 
a very central aspect of American Cold War policy making. In 
terms of the policy planning apparatus itself, the State 
Department's Policy Planning Staff was supplemented with the 
creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in the 
National Security Act passed in July 1947. The NSC would 
become very influential in the forming of foreign policy in 
relation to national security interests. There was now a 
body involved in policy formulation which was dominated by 
12 
the Pentagon. 
By mid-1947, the United States had begun to take 
significant action toward the aim of restoring stability to 
the world through fortification of the Western powers and 
Western-orl~nted nations. Th r'o ugh the European Recovery 
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Program (the Marshall Plan) and other general policies being 
formulated in 1947, the United States sought to encourage 
the stability that would enable the West to take a less 
defensive posture toward Soviet policies. 
This was also true of American policy toward Indochina. 
American officials were still hesitant about the idea of the 
Bao Dai solution, but an article published in Life magazine 
in December of 1947 was widely interpreted in France as an 
American endorsement of the proposed solution. The article, 
written by the former American ambassador to France, William 
C. Bullitt, advocated the policy of creating a movement 
arpund Bao Dai which Bullitt felt would attract substantial 
numbers of Vietnamese nationalists away from Ho and his 
government. In France, Bullitt's article was taken as a 
statement of American policy and a pledge of American moral 
13 
and economic support for Bao Dai. 
The prospect of American support was apparently 
encouraging to Baa Dai, who sensed that funerican involvement 
by way of pressuring France for Vietnamese independence was 
inevitable. On December 7, Bao Dai and Emile Bollaert, the 
High Commissioner of France for Indochina at that time, 
signed the first Ha Long Bay Agreement. This rather 
ambiguous accord associated Bao Dai with a Vietnamese 
nationalist movement sponsored by France, and included a 
vague promise for eventual independence within the French 
Union. The document was essentially meaningless, however, 
because it extended only a negligible amount of autonomy to 
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Vietnam. Bao Dai soon became skeptical of French sincerity 
and dissociated himself from the agreement. 
While the United States did not yet agree to endorse the 
Bao Dai solution early in 1948, American attention was 
increasingly directed toward the strategy of installing 
IItruly nationalistt' (meaning noncommunist nationalist) 
leadership in Vietnam in order to win support away from Ho 
and his government. This indicates a heightened concern with 
avoiding the prospect of cOlnmunist controlover Vietnam. It 
also reflects the view of Ho as primarily an agent of world 
communism; his commitment to nationalism was seen as 
subordinate in the long run. This trend can be better 
understood in the light of global policy planning in early 
1948. 
Kennan's perceptions of the application of his 
containment concept in East Asia were put forth on February 
24, 1948, in PPS 23. In accordance with the basic ideas of 
PPS 13, Kennan emphasized the limits of American power and 
the need to differentiate between areas of vital and 
peripheral interest to the national security. In relation to 
the East Asia in particular, Kennan also stressed the limits 
of American strength as a moral or ideological force. He 
stated that the American political philosophy and general 
outlook were not viable for the Asian peoples, and pointed up 
the enviable position of the United States vis a vis East 
Asia in terms of the ratio of wealth to population. Kennan 
believed the task confronting the United States was to 
maintaln this position without causing detriment to the 
S8 
national security, and that this entailed leaving behind the 
"sentimentality" and "the luxury of altruism" which the 
United Statesreallstlcally could no longer afford. 
Therefore, Kennan asserted the need above all for 
restraint in approaching East Asia. He noted frankly that in 
the course of adapting to modern technology, it was probable 
in Asia that "many peoples will fall, for varying periods, 
under the influence of Moscow, whose ideology has a greater-
lure for such peoples, and probably greater reality, than 
anything we could oppose to it." Continuing in this 




extended primarily to Japan and the 
The National Security Council's perception of the 
application of containment was quite different, reflecting 
more the tone of the "X" article. NSC 7, completed on March 
30, 1948, discussed American policy toward the world 
communist movement. This document viewed the interests of 
all the nations within the international movement, including 
the Soviet Union, as basically equivalent. It stated that 
"The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is 
the domination of the world." Another pOint emphasized by 
the NSC was the presence of communist fifth columns 
throughout the world, and that this implied a threat almost 
as grave to the United States as the external threat. All in 
all, the study advocated a "counter-offensive" rather than 
defensive stance. This concept of containment expanded on the 
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interpretation in the "X" article, and also involved 
increasing the military capabilities of the non-communist 
16 
nations. 
These two perspectives on American foreign policy help 
to explain Indochina policy in early 1948. The United States 
observed a policy of restraint toward involvement in East 
Asia, recognizing Western Europe as a higher priority to 
American national security. But American policy also 
exhibited a heightened awareness of the perceived need to 
prevent the area's coming under communist control. This led 
to the search for "truly nationalist" leaders within Vietnam 
with the intention of directing Vietnamese nationalism away 
from Ho Chi Minh and the DRV. 
Meanwhile, the somewhat reluctant Bao Dai met again with 
Bollaert on June 5, and witnessed the signing of the second 
Ha Long Bay Agreement by Bollaert and General Nguyen Van 
Xuan, head of the Republic of Cochinchina. In this accord 
France recognized Vietnamese independence and established the 
State of Vietnam with Bao Dai as Chief of state. But this 
did not signal a real cahnge from the first Ha Long Bay 
Agreement, because France specifically retained control over 
foreign relations and the Vietnamese army, and put off any 
17 
further transfers of power to future negotiations. 
June 1948 was a turning point in the Cold War. It saw 
not only the Berlin blockade late in the month but, more 
relevant to Indochina policy, the Tito-Stalin break in mid-
June. Tito's successful resistance to Stalin's attempt at 
subjugating Yugoslavia to Soviet control led to Yugoslavia's 
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expulsion from the Soviet bloc for "taktng . the route of 
18 
nationalism. II Thus it could no longer be sald that the 
world was divided in two camps. Uto's break nec8ssarHy led 
to a reevaluation of American policy. 
PPS 35, submitted to Secretary Mar'shall on ,June 30, 
evaluated the Tito-Stalin split and recommended the approach 
the United States should take in view of this. The Policy 
Planning Staff asserted that it would probably be possible 
for the United States to take advantage of this rift and of 
potential rifts between the Soviet Union and its other 
satellites as well. l~e document stressed continued caution, 
in that Yugoslavia was still a communist state, "dedicated to 
an ideology of hostility and contempt toward the bourgeois 
capitalist world." The paper stated that the American 
attitude toward Yugoslavia would depend upon the approach 
Tito would take toward the United Sta to:; and its allies, and 
that if this turned out to be cooperative, the United States 
would have no problem in developing economic relations with 
Yugoslavia. The nature of Yugoslavian domestic government, 
whether or not it was acceptable to American tastes, need not 
have any bearing on the development of 
19 
international 
relations. The Policy Planning Staff viewed Tita's 
defection with a degree of optimism, implying that it was 
conceivable for the United States to coexist with communist 
states which were not contrOlled by the Soviet Union. 
Ti to I s break with the Sov ie t Union would lead to 
consideration of the viability of a Titoist solution for 
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Vietnam, but the United States largely continued to see more 
value in attempting to locate a noncommunist indigenous 
solution. In trying to ascertain the extent of communist 
bloc influence in Ho's government, the State Department in 
July 1948 was able to find evidence that Ho was definitely a 
communist, but found nothing to indicate that he had direct 
ties with Moscow. The Department saw also that "Ho seems 
quite capable of retaining and even strengthening his grip on 
Indochina with no outside assitance other than continuing 
20 
procession of French puppet govts." In light of this, the 
United States urged France to give the government formed on 
June 5 "every chance to succeed by the granting to it of such 
concessions as will attract greatest possible number of non-
21 
communist elements." It was really too soon to tell 
whether Titoism would work in Yugoslavia, much less in 
Vietnam, so the United States directed its efforts toward a 
"truly nationalist" solution. 
In this connection, Secretary of State Marshall advised 
the U.S. Embassy in Parls on July 14 that, provided the 
French government approved the June 5 agreement and the 
change in the status of Cochinchlna from a colony to a part 
of the new government, the United States would consider 
public approval of the French action as a forward looking 
step. Marshall felt this policy would be helpful in 
22 
strengthening non-communist elements in Indochina. This 
shift in thinking in terms of American willingness to support 




of finding an alternative to Ho's form of 
Marshall apparently believed that this "truly 
nationalist" group would be able to induce Viet Minh 
supporters over to its position given greater French 
concessions. 
On September 27, the State Department produced its first 
extensive pollcy statement on Indochina. The document stated 
the short-term goal of American policy as assisting in a 
solution which would result in ending the war. Foremost 
among the long-term objectives advanced by the Department 
were to eliminate Communist influence in Indochina and see 
installed an independent nationalist state friendly to and 
compatible with Western conceptions of democracy. The 
document stated that Ho was probably supported by a 
"considerable majority," but that the United States had not 
urged the French to negotiate with him because of his record 
as a communist. This along with the frequent allusions in 
State Department documents to true nationalists suggests that 
the Department assumed that the majority would prefer a non-
communist government but supported Ho for lack of a better 
option. The policy statement also indicated a desire to 
arrange for trade relations with Indochina, 
political situation was stabilized. 
once the 
But all in all, the State Department paper had no 
solution to suggest. It stated that the Department was 
hesitant to pressure France too much because the United 
States was unable to present a solution and unwilling to 
intervene. The Depaptment also pointed up the fact that 
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France and Europe were higher priorities to United States 
security than was Indochina. The Department saw French 
military reconquest as highly undesirable but also saw French 
withdrawal as unworkable; thus the United States was left 
with a policy of essentially acqiescing to French strategies 
23 
with which it did not agree. 
Within the next year American policy toward East Asia in 
general and Indochina in particular changed radically. This 
was due in large part to the American reaction to the course 
of events in China. Through 1948, however, policy toward 
China was somewhat indecisive. A number of parallels exist 
between American policy toward China in 1948 and current and 
especially future policy toward Indochina. In this context, 
a brief examination of China policy in 1948 shows the irony 
of decisions made toward Indochina shortly thereafter. 
Although the United States considered Chiang Kai-shekls 
prospects for success highly unlikely, aid was extended to 
the Nationalist regime in 1948 because of the strong pro-
Chiang faction in Congress and constant pressures from 
outside the government in the form of a very powerful China 
lobby. The China Aid Act was passed in April 1948, even 
though most policy makers did not think it could appreciably 
alter the course of events in Chiang's favor. Truman had to 
extend the aid in order to receive the support he needed from 
the Congressional China bloc for Marshall Plan aid to Europe. 
China did not become a high national security priority until 
control passed completely to the Communists in October 1949; 
this was largely because of the attitude that it would be 
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impossible for the United States to influence the course of 
the civil war without enormous assistance to China. Mao had 
become too powerful, and Chiang's government was essentially 
bankrupt; therefore, the aid the U.S. would have to extend 
under these circumstances was beyond its means in view of the 
24 
higher importance of European recovery at this point. 
The Administration was unable to come up with a coherent 
China policy in 1948. There was no organized bloc in 
Congress which could effectively counter the pressures of the 
25 
China bloc and the China lobby. The Joint Chiefs also 
advocated continued support to Chiang in order to postpone a 
communist takeover in China, though they admitted that this 
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would not in all likelihood change the ultimate result. 
This peSSimistic reasoning would be reasserted in relation to 
Indochina very shortly. 
The State Department, on the other hand, favored working 
to facilitate a Titoist solution to the conflict in 1948. 
The Department saw the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split 
along the lines of the recent Tito-Stalin split as the most 
27 
realistic U.S. objective. In NSC 34, submitted on October 
13, 1948, and based on a previous study, PPS 39, the 
Department advanced this argument. The paper pointed out the 
vastness of the task of asserting control over all of China 
for the Kremlin, noting Mao's love of power and his firmly 
entrenched position in the Chinese Communist movement. The 
Department advocated a policy of trying to prevent China from 
falling under Soviet control, but did not consider it 
65 
practicable to expect or work toward the unification of China 
28 
under Chiang Kai-shek. But the State Department was 
somewhat reticent in asserting its views, because the Titoist 
hypothesis was met by skepticism from President Truman, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress. 
Until 1949, then, the United States had no single 
defined policy toward China, but rather continued to provide 
aid to the Nationalists, knowing full well that this was not 
sufficient to turn the tide against the Communists. There 
were essentially very few options for China policy, 
considering the strength of the China lobby and the 
Congressional China bloc, the skepticism outside the State 
f 
Department toward the viability of encouraging a Titoist 
solution, the limits of American military and economic 
resources, and the overriding importance of strengthening 
Western Europe in the light of the perceived Soviet threat. 
As with China policy, Indochina policy still suffered in 
late 1948 and early 1949 from lack of clarity due to 
conflicting interests within the policy-making apparatus and 
to the dearth of options which were perceived as workable. 
The State Department, while interested in finding a 
noncommunist solution to end the war in Indochina, continued 
to hesitate in its support of Bao Dai. In January of 1949, 
Truman began his second term in office and brought with him a 
new Secretary of State to replace Marshall, who had resigned 
due to ill health. The new Secretary was ex-Under Secretary 
Dean Acheson, a strident anticommunist with an approach at 
least as tough as the President's. 
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A few days before the inauguration, Acting Secretary of 
State Robert Lovett voiced his concern about the progressing 
French negotiations with Bao Dai in a telegram to the Embassy 
in Paris. As noted above, his feeling was that while state 
supported a "truly nationalist!! solution in Indochina, 
we cannot at this time irretrevably [sic] commit US to 
support of native govt which by failing develop appeal 
among Vietnamese might become virtually puppet govt, 
separated from people and existing only by presence 
French military forces.29 
Similarly, Acheson told the Ambassador in Paris a month later 
of his doubts regarding the extent of French concessions. He 
remarked that the State Department was aware that "over past 
three years Fr have shown no impressively sincere intention 
or desire make concessions which seem necessary solve 
Indochina question." The United States would need stronger 
evidence of progress before it would agree to support the Bao 
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Dai regime publicly. Acheson frankly admitted his 
awareness of the emptiness of French policy, but given the 
alternatives of allowing Ho to win control or direct U.S. 
involvement, he persisted in trying to pressure France to 
concede more ground to Vietnamese nationalism. 
This points up a problem with American policy through 
the late 1940s in general. Through its policies of 
"neutrality" in Indochina and financial support of France in 
Western Europe, the United States hoped to achieve its main 
goal: the building of strong and friendly noncommunist 
states to work toward the containment of communism. But 
France, it can be argued, was more concerned with retaining 
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its colonial possessions than with containment. The United 
States hoped to persuade France to act toward the fulfillment 
of American aims in Southeast Asia yet was not willing either 
to intervene directly, or to threaten France with sanctions, 
because of the more serious repercussions these actions would 
have on national security. 
On March 8, lengthy negotiations between the French and 
Bao Dai were concluded with the Elysee Agreements, which 
reaffirmed Vietnam's status as an independent state within 
the French Union, but again gave control of foreign relations 
and military affairs entirely to France. Apparently, Bao Dai 
felt he had few options if he was to have any role in the 
government, and was counting on support and assistance from 
31 
the United States. 
March 1949 also saw the formation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). This was an important step 
toward increasing the American global role. As Acheson 
stated it on March 18: 
.•• the security of the United States cannopt be defined 
in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat 
to international peace and security anywhere in the 
world is of direct concern to this country. Therefore 
it is our policy to help free peoples to maintain their 
integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe 
or in the Americas, but wherever the aid we are able to 
provide can be effective.32 
Using these terms reminiscent of the Truman Doctrine, Acheson 
suggested that the collective security pact was geared toward 
"waging peace." This is interesting in view of the fact that 
militarily, the pact did not enhance American security too 
significantly. Rather, because European recovery had 
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progressed quite well through the Marshall Plan, the United 
States could now, through the means of the NATO military 
alliance, work toward strengthening its politiqal bonds with 
33 
and influence upon Western Europe. 
Meanwhile, on the question of extending support to Bao 
Dai, the WE (Western European Affairs) and EUR desks of the 
State Department recommended that, in light of repeated 
French requests for American economic aid for Indochina, the 
United States should provide assistance to Bao Dai. WE and 
EUR advised this even though they still had serious 
reservations concerning the chances for the new regime's 
success: 
While we obviously do not wish to get ourselves 
involved in a repetition of the painful Chiang Kai-shek 
situation, we must realize that the only alternative to 
a Bao Dai regime is one led by the Communist Ho Chi 
Minh. It is therefore believed that Baa Dai, although a 
very weak reed, represents the only solution to France's 
problem in Indochina and we should give him such support 
as we can without getting ourselves involved with him in 
case he turns out to be a failure.34 
This clearly pessimistic appraisal recommended American 
support for Bao Dai while giving all the reasons that it 
would most likely not succeed. The fact that the Chiang 
situation is mentioned is quite significant, for the 
recommendation is essentially for' a repeat of American policy 
toward Chiang: extend nominal support, but not enough to 
implicate American prestige in the likely event that it will 
be a losing proposition. This is especially significant in 
view of the imminence of the fall of the Kuomintang at this 
point. It indicates a heightened perception of the communist 
threat in East Asia, and a resultant intensification of the 
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perceived urgency of American action toward a temporary 
solution. American officials began to push for the Bao Dai 
solution with no illusions about its prospects for long term 
success. 
The State Department did not, however, immediately 
follow the recommendation of the WE and EUR desks. Rather, 
Acheson instructed the Saigon desk to be very careful not to 
endorse Bao Dai prematurely in order to retain freedom of 
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action. But a few days later, George Abbot, the American 
Consul General in Saigon, sent Acheson an extensive review of 
the Indochina situation, prepared for the New Delhi Foreign 
Service conference the previous February. In this study, 
Abbot restated the belief that the only alternatives to the 
Bao Dai solution were "either continued costly colonial 
warfare or French withdrawal leaving a Communist-controlled 
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government in a strategic area of Southeast Asia." 
As a result, on May 10 Acheson stated that the State 
Department did in fact desire the success of the Bao Dai 
experiment, since it seemed to be the only resolution apart 
from communist control. Acheson also stated that the U.S. 
would recognize the Bao Dai Government and consider' extending 
economic and military aid to Indochina, provided that France 
offered concessions "to make Baodai solution attractive to 
nationalists." Acheson also emphasized the importance of 
making concessions in view of the "possibly short time 
remaining before Commie successes Chi are felt Indochina." 
Acheson introduced the possibility of getting support for Bao 
-
Dai from noncommunist Asian nations so as to avoid the 
appearance of the Bao Dai solution as a "gambit engineered by 
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FR, US and UK as part strategy of West-East conflict." 
This gives the impression of a kind of public relations 
approach in order to win the support of noncommunist 
nationalists to the Bao Dai government. 
Acheson reiterated his conviction that a non-communist 
solution was the only solution a few days later in a telegram 
to the Consulate in Hanoi. On the subject of communist 
nationalists in Vietnam, Acheson stated that 
This 
Question whether Ho as much nationalist as Commie is 
irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial areas are 
nationalists. With achievement natl aims (i.e., 
independence) their objective necessarily becomes 
subor'dination state to Commie purposes and ruthless 
extermination not only opposition groups but all 
elements suspected even slightest deviation ••.. lt must 
be conceded theoretical possibility exists estab Natl 
Communist state on pattern Yugoslavia in any area beyond 
reach Soviet army •..• while Vietnam out of reach Soviet 
army it will doubtless be by no means out of reach Chi 
Commie hatchet men and armed forces.38 
certainly clarifies the vehemence of Acheson's 
anticommunist attitude. He saw the possibility of a Titoist 
solution as only "theoretical. 11 Also significant is the 
growing threat felt by the proximity of Chinese Communism. 
While specific policy toward Bao Dai was being 
formulated, the Policy Planning Staff had begun work on a 
paper designed to develop United States policy toward 
Southeast Asia in general. The drafting of PPS 51 began in 
February, 1949. The study considered Southeast Asia the 
target of a Soviet-directed offensive and viewed the region 
as vital because it was located at a crossroads in global 
communication and was a source of important raw materials. 
PPS 51 viewed the possibility of communist control in the 
area especially in terms of the domino effect this would have 
upon the Middle East and Australia. The paper also viewed 
Southeast Asia as "a vi tal segmen t on the line of 
containment, stretching from Japan southward around the 
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Indian Peninsula." This was a crucial shift in thinking in 
regard to the application of containment in East Asia; 
previously, policy had adhered to Kennan's notion of a line 
of containment composed of island strongpoints, especially 
Japan and the Philippines. Now the Planning Staff drew the 
line of containment on the Asian mainland itself. 
While the paper suggested the importance of noncommunist 
victory in Southeast Asia and called for a more activist 
American policy in the area, it did not recommend extensive 
stepping up of the involvement of American economic and 
military assistance, though it called for these in small 
amounts. But in the end, PPS 51 was only sent to the field 
as an information source, and its recommendations were not 
used. The diff.iculty the United Sta tes continued to have in 
finding a viable solution or course of action which would not 
imperil American prestige resulted in a policy somewhere 
between supporting France and doing nothing. Thus by July 
40 
1949, PPS 51 "had become, in effect, a non-policy paper." 
The paper's failure reflected, for one thing, the ascendancy 
of the FE and EUR desks over the PPS. These offices and 
their subordinates generally worked out poLLcy among 
themselves, following PPS strategies only when this was 
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expedient 1n terms of their own attitudes and strategies. 
Later in July, Congress ratified the NATO treaty. and 
President Truman sent Congress the Mutual Defertse Assistance 
Bill, the main purpose of which was to appropriate military 
aid to the Pact nations. The bill was also to authorize 
Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds for East Asia. The 
bill was debated in Congress through September' , and 
controversy erupted because of demands by the China bloc that 
the bill include funds for aid to Nationalist China. Some 
MAP funding would have to go to Asia in order to get the 
desired amount for Europe through Congress, and finally in 
September it was agreed that $15 million would be authorized 
for the "general area of China." This ltwrding left the 
President options in terms of deciding how to use the money. 
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act was passed at long 
last through Congress immediately following Truman's 
announcement on September 22 that the Soviet Union had 
exploded its first atomic bomb in August. The abrupt end of 
the American atomic monopoly was a great shock to many, and 
would have far-reaching repercussions on American policy 
making in the next months. It had the immediate effect of 
allowing the MDA Act to pass through Congress. In the eyes 
of the Congressional China bloc, the $15 million contingency 
fund was to be used to assist Chinese Nationalists. But the 
actual result of the vague wording of the Act was that most 
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of the funding would be used in Southeast Asia. 1~e 
authorization of this funding would soon stimulate planning 
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for its use, which ultimately led to an activist American 
containment policy in Southeast Asia. 
The formation of NATO and the authorization of MDA 
appropriations illustrate a major shift in 1949 toward 
militarism in the application of containment. The concept of 
military preparedness became increasingly important in the 
planning of American strategy; at this point the United 
States began to consider rearming West Germany against the 
growing Soviet threat. The Marshall Plan had been fairly 
successful in shoring up Western Europe economically, but by 
the middle of 1949, this was not enough. 
American insecurity was heightened by the Soviet bomb 
test in August because of the clear implications this had on 
the balance of world power and on the perception of American 
invulnerability to a military threat. Insecurity was 
compounded by the success of the Chinese Communists through 
1949, culminating in the formal establishment of the People's 
Republic of China on October 1. This was a much changed 
world, a different Cold War, and one in which the old 
containment policy did not appear to be an adequate defense 
of the West and its economic and political systems. As 
tensions mounted late in 1949, policy was reevaluated, and 
the American approach toward Southeast Asia and toward the 
Franco-Vietnamese 
substantially. 
conflict in particular changed 
The result of the reassessment of American policy toward 
Asia was the NSC 48 series written late in December 1949-
Through NSC 48, policy makers aimed at formulating a coherent 
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general statement of Arnerican policy goals and strategies in 
East Asia. NSC 48/1, presented by the National Security 
Council on December 23, stated that the ultimate Arner'iean 
objective in Asia was the development of independent and 
self-sufficient nations friendly to the U.S. It viewed the 
Soviet Union as the foremost threat to Asian independence, 
and concluded therefore that the short-term objective of the 
Uni ted States "must be to contain and where feasible to 
reduce the power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a 
degree that the Soviet Union is not capable of threatening 
the security of the United States from that area." 
In reference to China, NSC 48/1 advanced the view that 
in the near term, Soviet influence would grow stronger, but 
allowed for the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split later in 
time, depending on the success of the Chinese communist 
regime. It also noted that the U.S. could not expect to 
lessen communist control of China, but U.S. policy could have 
an effect on the development of Sino-Soviet relations. 
Another strand of policy regarding China in the study was 
that the U.S. should not restrict trade between friendly 
nations and China, provided this excluded items of possible 
military use against the Western powers in Asia. The paper's 
discussion of Southeast Asia basically served to restate 
earlier general policy goals, but did point out the 
importance of Asia as a source of raw materials of strategic 
value, especially tin and rubber, and as a market for the 
in 
United States and Western powers. 
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On December 30, President Truman approved the document 
with certain changes. Among the significant additions in the 
resultant paper, NSC 48/2, was the objective of developing 
"sufficient military power in selected non-Communist nations 
of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further 
encroachment by communism." This indicates once again the 
attention being given by this time to military preparedness 
in the face of the communist threat. Regarding Vietnam, the 
modified paper stated that "particular attention should be 
given to the problem of French Indo-China and action should 
be taken to bring home to the French the urgency of removing 
the barriers to the obtaining by Bao Dai or other non-
Communist nationalist leaders of the support of a substantial 
proportion of the Vietnamese." Finally, NSC 48/2 stated that 
the "sum of $75,000,000 for assistance to the general area of 
China, which was made available under Section 303 of the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, should be programmed 
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as a matter of urgency." Thus while the policy 
reevaluation of December essentially involved a consolidation 
of earlier statements on separate regions, it pointed up the 
priority being given to devising plans for using the newly 
authorized MAP funds. 
While American policy goals regarding Indochina were not 
altered early in 1950, the immediate importance of their 
achievement and the zeal with which this was approached were 
substantially intensified. The greatly increased activism 
was largely the product of the communist victory in China and 
its domestic as well as international repercussions, and the 
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creation of funds with which to finance an activist policy. 
The "fall ll of China had a serious impact on domestic 
poli tics. A heated debate arose over IIwho lost China," and 
the China bloc and China lobby began to criticize the 
Administration, especially the State Department. Secretary 
Acheson addressed the National Press Club on January 12 and 
attempted to focus attention away from China and toward the 
issues of general importance to American interests in Asia. 
Acheson stressed the development of the two lines of 
containment in East Asia: the Pacific perimeter off the 
Asian coast, and the line through the Southern and Southeast 
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Asian mainland. The emphasis on broader policy issues did 
not, however, succeed in diverting the attention of the China 
bloc. This led to a perceived need on the part of the 
Admlnlstration to demonstrate American willingness and 
ability to act decisively in Asia. It also led to the 
shuffling of personnel within the State Department in order 
to attract less attention to certain officials who were 
suspected of not having done everything in their power to 
avel't the Communist victory in China. 
Another factor which intensified the felt need to act in 
Southeast Asia was the recognition of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam by the People's Republic on January 18. The tHO 
nations also concluded a trade agreement for military aid. 
It should also be noted that Chinese Communist troops had 
been stationed since late in 1949 at the Sino-Vietnamese 
border. The Soviet Union also extended recognition to the 
DRV on January 30. This accelerated the push within the 
United States toward recognition of Bao Dai's government. 
Acheson stated on February 1 that the Soviet recognition of 
the DRV "should remove any illusions as to the 'nationalist' 
nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveal Ho in his true colors 
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as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina." 
The next day, Secretary Acheson recommended to the President 
that the United States extend diplomatic recognition to the 
Three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 
Truman complied with this, and United States recognition was 
announced on February 7, at which time Britain also extended 
recognition to Bao Dai. 
This clarifies the position of Vietnam as a Far Eastern 
locus of the worldwide East-West struggle. This approach 
toward Vietnam was intensified by the advent of fervent 
domestic anticommunism early in 1950. On February 9, Senator 
Joseph R. McCarthy made his first charges of communist 
infiltration of the State Department in his famous speech in 
Wheeling, West Virginia. These and later accusations toward 
State Department officials were in large part an outgrowth of 
the search for an explanation to the question of who "lost" 
China. The mass hysteria provoked by McCarthy and his 
Congressional allies would have serious effects on public 
opinion. Mounting anticommunist fervor on the domestic front 
would naturally only further advance the anticommunist 
tendency tn AmerIcan forelgn poHcy making. 
In connection with the growing interpretation of events 
in Vietnam as part of a global struggle, Acheson reported on 
February 16 that the French, on the basis of this view, were 
requesting American military aid to France in Indochina 
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through Section 303 funding. The United States was already 
planning to send a mission to Southeast Asia to study the 
appropriations of these funds. But even with American 
recognition of Bao Dai and plans to extend economic and 
military aid to Vietnam, the United States could not secure 
t.he alliance of the noncommunist neighboring states. 
Ambassador Stanton in Bangkok reported to Secretary Acheson 
that 
It is transparently clear that Asiatic neighbors ot 
Indochina consider Bao Dai a French creation and a 
French puppet; despite current and anticipated actions 
of support by US and western powers they prepared sell 
his regime short, if status Baa Dai remains 
undrasticlaly modified; even if such changes made 
promptly, he must exert effective leadership comparable 
to Ho's. 
Stanton continued, saying that the "missing component II was 
not American assistance, but was, as earlier, further French 
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concessions. But this would not prove to be a deterrent; 
the course of events continued to lntensify the American 
perception of the urgency of combatting communism in the 
area. 
At the end of February, the State Department submitted 
NSC 64, a draft on Indochina policy. The paper presented the 
threat of communist aggression:tn Indochina as part of a 
larger communist plan to eventually "seize all of Southeast 
Asia," Pointing up the importance of proximity to Communist 
China, it asserted that a "decision to contain communist 
expansion at the border of Indochina must be considered as a 
part of a wider study to prevent communi.st aggresslon into 
other parts of Southeast Asia." Altogether, the sallent 
point of the position paper was its interpretation of 
Indochina as a vital area in terms of its place on the line 
of containment on the Asian mainland; it also asserted the 
likelihood of a domino effect in Southeast Asia lf Indochina 
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were controlled by a communist government. By this time, 
then, Southeast Asia was decisively viewed as a vital area in 
the inter'ests of United States na tional security. This 
change was a result of the need to contain China; the threat 
to Europe was no longer the utmost American concern in making 
policy toward East Asia. 
The United St.ates began constructively in March to plan 
the implementation of containment in Southeast. Asia. This 
involved both economic and military assistance, and a litt.le 
public relations work as well. Secretary Acheson suggested 
to the Embassy in France that the U.S. extend aid to France 
in Indochina, but stressed that it was important to "make Bao 
Dai appear to be the overt recipient" so as to help in 
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solidifying his political position. 
On March 6, the first official American economic mission 
to Southeast Asia, headed by R. Allen Gr'iffin, was dispatched 
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with the main objective of deciding upon appropriate projects 
to be financed by Section 303 funds. Between March 6 and 
April 22, the Griffin mission visited Indochina, Singapore, 
Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia. Its findings helped in 
directing American economic aid in Southeast Asia, but the 
mission seems to have had the additional objective of 
demonstrating the American interest in and commitment to 
constructively counter'ing communism in the region. The 
conclusions Griffin formed regarding the political situation 
and the role of the United states in Southeast Asia 
essentially conformed to the Department's established policy 
line. Thus the well-publicized mission served as a public 
relations venture to enhance public reception of the 
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Administration's decision to send aid to Southeast Asia. 
The growing trends in the late 19403 toward globalism 
and military preparedness in the face of the threat of 
communist aggression, and the changing interpretation of the 
strategy of containment came together in April 1950 with the 
completion og NSC 68. The study was written by an ad hoc 
group from both the State and Defense Departments, under the 
supervision of Paul Nitze, George Kennan's recent successor 
as director of the Policy Planning Staff • NSC 68 was a 
broad reevaluation of national security goals and strategies, 
stimulated partly by the unexpected Soviet atomic bomb test 
and the resultant greater possibility that the Soviet Union 
would choose to start a war with the United States. Another 
major stimulus was the communist victory in China. Because 
of these events, the study indicated that the global balance 
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of power had shifted in the favor of the Soviet Union, and 
that action must be taken to reverse this. 
Setting up the basic conflict between the "free" society 
of the United States and the "slave" society of the Soviet 
Union, NSC 68 viewed the world situation in terms of this 
polarization imposed upon the United States by Soviet 
communism: "The assault on free institutions is world-wide 
now, and in the context of the present polarization of power 
a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat 
everywhere." Implicit here, and throughout the study, is the 
definltion of American interests based on the world communist 
threat. This constitutes a shift from Kennan's original 
concept of containment, whereby the United States would 
defend selected areas deemed vital rather than accord equal 
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importance to all nations threatened by communism. 
Kennan's strategy was no longer considered adequate in view 
of the events of 1949. 
There are a number of other points where NSC 68 shows 
the evolution of the containment concept from Kennan's 
original idea. For example, in defining the policy itself, 
the document greatly stressed the importance of military 
strength, almost to the exclusion of the role of political, 
economic, and psychological strength, which Kennan had seen 
as central to the building of self-confidence in the Western-
oriented world. NoSe 68 stated that "without superior 
aggregate military strength, in being and readily 
mobilizable, a policy of 'containment' -- which is in effect 
82 
a policy of calculated and gradual coercion is no more 
than a policy of bluff." 
The paper conti.nued to buDd the case for mili tary 
preparedness: lithe Soviet Union is widening the gap between 
its preparedness for war and the unpreparedness of the free 
world for war. lI It also cited the communist victory in China 
and the "politico-economic situation in the rest of South and 
South-East Asia ll as an asset to the Soviet Union regarding 
communist expansion. No mention of a possible Sino-Soviet 
split was made. Because of the emphasis on military 
strength, NSC 68 did not suggest any strategy for taking 
advantage of possible rifts within the communist movement, in 
contrast to Kennan's thought. This omission can perhaps be 
explained in part by the overall concern in the paper with 
the short term importance of appearances; any communist 
victory, whether or not it eventually worked to the advantage 
of the Soviet Union, would appear to be a short term loss for 
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the United States. 
In conclusion, NSC 68 advocated the rapid build-up of 
political, economic, and military strength in the "free 
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world II in order to regain the initiative in the Cold War. 
The document was to become the blueprint for American policy 
making in the Cold War. It illustrates the evolution of the 
concept of containment since the term was coined by Kennan in 
1947 toward a more militaristic interpretation, incorporating 
a "zero-sumll approach, whereby every Soviet gain implied an 
American loss, and vice versa. This in turn implied that 
virtually every area outside the Soviet bloc was vital to 
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American national security. NSC 68 effectively legitimated 
the broad public rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine by writing 
it into policy; this universalist rhetorIc was employed 
largely in order to mobilize Congressional and public support 
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for the proposed military build-up. But NSC 68 was not a 
speech, it was a policy plan; this indicates the extent to 
which American globalist anticommunism was accepted by policy 
makers. 
The general tone of NSC 68 and its policy 
recommendations was reflected in American policy toward 
Vietnam and the heightened need which policy makers felt for 
an ~ active policy there. On April 10 the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff reaffirmed the "critical strategic importance" of 
Southeast Asia to the United States in terms of its location 
as a crossroad of communications, the presence of important 
raw materials there, and its position as "a vital segment in 
the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan 
southward and around the Indian Peninsula." The Joint Chiefs 
also pointed out the inevitable domino effect the fall of 
Indochina would have on the other Southeast Asian states, and 
recommended the "early implementation of military aid 
programs for Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philipplines, and Burma." In addition, the establishment of 
an American military 
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recommended. 
aid group in Indochina was 
On May 1, President Truman approved the allocation of 
$10 million for military aid to Indochina, and the decision 
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to extend this aid was announced by Secretary Acheson on May 
8. The planned establishment of an Amer'ican military and 
economic mission to the Three Associated States 'of Indochina 
was publicly announced on May 25. This policy had therefo!'e 
been firmly established some weeks before the North Korean 
invasion of South Korea on June 25. The outbreak of the 
Korean War did, however, stimulate an acceleration in the 
allocation of military aid to Indochina, as well as the 
dispatch of the Military Assistance Advisory Group to 
Vietnam. This was announced by the President on June 27. 
The outbreak of war also had the effect of immediately 
va~idating the policy directions and attitudes advanced in 
NSC 68. As Secretary Acheson remarked later, the document 
had been a policy in search of an application to confirm its 
viability until June 25, when "Korea came along and saved 
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us." As President Truman stated on June 27, "the attack 
upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has 
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent 
59 
nations and will now use armed invasion and war." Indeed, 
the outbreak of the Korean War did seem to justify the course 
of American policy toward what was seen as a global communist 
threat. It served to confirm the direction of American 
foreign policy toward globalism and increased military 
preparedness. 
Throughout the postwar period, American policy makers 
had been aware that the economic aid the United States 
extended to France was being used in various proportions for 
the Fre,v"; effort in the war with Vietnam. The first direct 
U.S. aid to Indochina was allocated in 1950, but this was not 
so much an abrupt change in policy as the c~lmination of 
indirect American involvement in Indochinese affairs since 
the conclusion of World War II. The increasing lack of 
flexibility in American foreign policy across the late 1940s, 
both toward Indochina and toward the communist world in 
general, led the United States to direct involvement in 
Vietnam. French unwillingness to grant real concessions to 
Vietnamese independence compounded by American unwillingness 
to see a communist government in power in Vietnam made it 
impossible for the United States to approach its national 
security objectives in Southeast Asia without 
directly involved. 
becoming 
The possibility of the existence of Vietnam as a 
communist state independent of Soviet influence was discussed 
within the State Department between 1947 and 1950, but the 
acceleration of the Cold War with the Soviet Union made this 
appear to be too risky. Also, Titoism was still quite new, 
and did not have an appreciable impact on foreign policy 
planning by 1950. The growth of fervent anticommunism in 
America reached a peak in that year with the beginning of 
McCarhtyism; altogether, the prevalence of the Cold War view 
of a global Soviet-directed communist threat precluded 
approaching Ho Chi Minh as a strong and effective nationalist 
leader first, and a Moscow-trained communist second. 
Thus the United States felt forced to some degree to 
support French policy in Indochina for want of more promiSing 
options. Events in 191-+9 served to catalyze active American 
economic involvement in Vietnam. The "fall" of China and the 
ensuing accusations of weak American policy there resulted in 
a perceived need to act decisively somewher'e in the Far East. 
This was due to pressures from the military establishment, 
the Congressional China bloc, and the China lobby. This 
perceived need was compounded by the authorization of funds 
for the area, largely due again to pressures from the China 
bloc, which led to the creation of ways to utilize these 
funds through a policy reassessment late in 1949. And this 
in turn led to the push for a more activist policy in 
Southeast Asis early in 1950. 
In broad terms, the extension of direct American aid to 
Indochina in 1950 can be considered an outgrowth of the Cold 
War and the attitudes and strategies it produced. By 1950, 
United States policy toward Vietnam was already established, 
and while the stakes for the United States would change in 
subsequent administrations, the ultimate underlying goal of 




1. "United States Assistance to Other Countries from the 
Standpoint of National Security," repoft by Joint 
Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
April 29, 1941, extracted in Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 11-
83. 
2. Porter, 1:145. 
3. Telegram from Secretary of state Marshall to Ambassador 
Caffery in Paris, May 13, 1947, US-V~ Relations, Book 8, 
V. B. 2, pp. 100-102. 
4. See Airgram from Reed to Acheson, June 14, 1947, in 
Porter, 1:151-156. 
5. Telegram from Marshall to Reed, ,July 17, 1947, in Ibid., 
pp.156-157. 
6. Telegrams from Vice Consul O'Sullivan in Hanoi and 
Consul Reed in Saigon to Secretary Marshall, July 21 and 
24, 1947, in Ibid., pp. 158-161. 
7. Telegram from Ambassador Leighton Stuart in Nanking to 
Secretary of State Marshall, October 18, 1947, US-VN 
Relations, Book 8, V.B.2, pp. 114-115. 
8. Secretary of State Marshall's address at the Harvard 
Commencement, June 5, 1947, transcript in Bernstein and 
Matusow, pp. 257-259, quotation taken from p. 259. 
9. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (New Yo['k: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 25. 
10. [George F. Kennan], liThe Sources of Soviet Conduct," 
Fore~ £l.ffairs, July 1947, pp. 572--576, 580-582, quotes 
taken from pp. 574 and 575. 
11. "Resume of World Situation," PPS 13, November 6, 1947, 
extract printed in Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 90-97. 
12. Blum, p. 18. 
13. US-VN Relations, Book 1, II.A.2, p. 11. 
14. Patti, p. 396. 
15. "Review of CUrrent Trends: U.S. Foreign Policy," PPS 
23, February 24, 1948, excerpted in Etzold and Gaddis, 
pp. 97-100,114-124,161-163, and (on the Far East) 226-
228. 
88 
16. "The Position of the United St11 tes with Respec t to 
Soviet-Directed World Communism," NSC 7, March 30, 1948, 
in Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 164-169. 
17. Patti, p. 458. 
18. 
19. 
Walter LaFeber, Ameri.9..9...L Ru~ia! 
1945-1980, Fourth ed., (New York: 
1980 r;p-:- 77. 
and the Cold War: -- ---
John Wiley and Sons, 
"The Attitude of This 
Yugoslavia," PPS 35, 
Gadd is, pp. 169-172. 
Government Toward 





20. Telegram from Secretary of State Marshall to U.S. 
Embassy in Nanking, July 2 , 1948, US-VN Relations, Book 
8, V.B.2, pp. 127-129. 
21. Telegram from Secretary Marshall to Ambassador Caffery, 
July 3, 1948, in Ibid., pp. 130-133, quotation taken 
from p. 132. 
22. Telegram from Secretary Marshall to U.S. Embassy in 
Paris, July 14, 1948, in Ibi~., p. 135. 
23. Department of State Policy Statement on Indochina, 
September 21, 1948, in Ibid.,pp. 143-149. 
24. Etzold and Gaddis, p. 236. 
25. Blum, p. 22. 
26. See "Possible Courses of Action for the U.S. With 
Respect to the Critical Situation in China," NSC 22/1, 
August 6, 1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 238-2 L1O. 
21. Blum, p. 35. 
28. "United States Policy Toward China," NSC 34, October 13, 
1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 240-241. See also "U.S. 
Policy Toward China," PPS 39/1, November 23, 1948, in 
Ibid., pp. 241-251. PPS 39/1 is not an official 
statement of Department policy, but rather an 
elaboration on the views put forth in NSC 34, by Kennan. 
29. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett to 
the American Embassy in Paris, January 11, 1949, US-VN 
Relations, Book 8, V.B.2, p. 152. 
30. Telegram from Secretary Acheson to the American Embassy 
in France, February 25, 1949, in Porter, 1: 183-184. 
31. Patti, p. 391. 
32. Statement by Secretary Acheson on NATO, March 18, 1949, 
89 
from U.S. Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1949, 
pp. 384-388, excerpted in Bernstein and Matusow, pp. 
275-279, quote taken from p. 277. 
33. LaFeber, p. 85. 
34. Memorandum from Theodore C. Achilles, Office of Western 
European Affairs, to John D. Hickerson, Director, 








from Secretary Acheson to the American Consul 
May 2, 1949, US-VN Rel~tions, Book 8, V.B.2, 
Despatch from Abbot to Secretary Acheson, May 5, 1949, 
in Ibid., pp. 154-189, quote taken from p. 157. 
Telegram from Secretary Acheson to the Consul in Saigon, 
May 10, '1949, in Ibid., pp. 190-192. 
38. Telegram from Acheson to the Consulate in Hanoi, May 20, 








Blum, p. 112. 
Ibi'!. , p. 123. 
Ibid. , p. 124. 
Ibid. , p. 125. 
"The Position of the United Sta tes 
Asia," NSC 48/1, December 23, 1949, 





"The Position of 
Asia," NSC L18/2, 
272. 
the United States with Resepct to 
December 30, 1949, in Ibid., pp. 265-
45. Blum, p. 199} 
46. ±bid, p. 183. Acheson's speech can be found in the 
Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, pp. 111-
118. 
47. Statement by Acheson on Soviet 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 
Porter, 1: 225. 
Recognition of 
Fe bruary 1, 1950, 
the 
in 
48. Memorandum of Conversati6n by Acheson, February 16, 
1950, in Ibid., pp. 237-239. 
49. Telegram from Stanton to Acheson, February 17, 1950, in 
JO 
US-VN Relations, Book 8, V.B.2, pp. 280-281. 
50. "The Position of 
Indochina," NSC 64, 
282-284. 
the United States with Respect to 
FebruBl'y 27, 1950, in Ib~_., pp. 
51. Telegram from Acheson to Ambassador Bruce in France, 
March 4, 1950, in Porter, 1:244-245. 
52. Blum, p. 202. 
53. Gaddis, p. 91. 
54. Jbid., p. 102. 
55. "United States Objectives and Programs for National 
Security," NSC 68, April 14, 1950, printed in Etzold and 
Gaddis, pp. 385-442, quotations taken from p. 389, p. 
402, and p. 409. 
56. Gaddis, pp. 108-109. 
57. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Secretary of Defense, April 10, 1950, 
Relations, Book 8, V.B.2, pp. 308-314. 
for the 
in US-VN 
58. Dean Acheson at a Princeton Seminar, July 8-9, 1953, 
quoted from the Acheson Papers by LaFeber, p. 100. 
59. Presidential Statement on Korea, June 27, 1950, in 
Bernstein and Matu30W, pp. 437-438. 
91 
CHAPTER IV 
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
The development of American policy toward Vietnam 
between 1945 and 1950 can only be understood in the context 
of Cold War concepts and decision making. Vietnam policy 
grew out of general principles and global strategies directed 
toward the Soviet Union and its allies. But it was also a 
specific policy constructed for a particular area, and must 
be analyzed as such as well While none of the standard 
interpretations of American involvement in Vietnam can by 
itself sufficiently explain the nature of or impetus behind 
American policy between 1945 and 1950, taken in combination, 
these analyses provide a comprehensive framework for 
understanding changes in this crucial period of 
policy making. 
Vietnam 
A reexamination of the decisive shifts in American 
policy toward Vietnam between 1945 and 1950 demonstrates the 
applications of different interpretations to the actual 
course of events. The first major policy shift of the 
period occured in 1945, when Roosevelt gave up his concept of 
international trusteeship for Indochina because of French and 
British opposition. This change was motivated largely by 
realpolitik imperatives. Roosevelt was truly opposed to 
colonialism, but Indochina was simply not important enough in 
the larger scheme of things to risk a breach with the Western 
Allies. Economic motivations apply to this decision to the 
extent that the concern for continued cooperative relations 
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with Western Europe took priority over access to the economy 
of Southeast Asia. 
The nature and course of Amerlcan policy tbward Vietnam 
through 1946 continued to reflect the high priority given to 
European recovery more than the direct importance of 
Southeast Asia. A stable and confident Western Europe was 
cruclal to maintaining the balance of power' with the Soviet 
Union, and therefore the United States felt pressured to 
support France to the extent of affirming French sovereignty 
in Indochina (although the United States did not support 
French policy in the region). This policy of noninvolvement 
beyond tacit acceptance of the French role in Indochina was 
based on a pragmatic assessment of the relative importance of 
strengthening France toward the aim of enhancing American 
national security. 
Ideological and economic motivations influenced the 
realpoliti~ approach in American policy at this time, because 
the American idea of a balance of power assumed the 
importance of stabilizing capitalism and stabili zing 
democratic institutions in Western Europe. In other words, 
these goals served as the foundations for American 
realpoli tik under Truman, because Soviet power was a 
potential threat not only militarily, but politically, 
economically, and socially as well. Building a strong and 
confident Western Europe indicated by definition 
strengthening the Western economic and political system. 
American policy toward Indochina began to shift again in 
1947. The United States maintained a policy of "neutrality" 
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beyond basic support of French sovereingty, but American 
officials became more critical of French policy and conduct 
in the Franco-Vietnamese war and the United States began to 
try to exert more pressure on the French to make an effort 
resolving the conflict. France seemed to be 
increasingly intent upon recovering complete control, and 
this was not in the American national interest. The United 
States began to search in 1947 and 1948 for a viable 
solution. The State Department briefly discussed the 
possibility of unifying Vietnam under national communism 
through Ho in this period. But the suggestion of a communist 
regime independent of Soviet influence received little 
attention, even after Titols break in 1948. Apart from the 
fact that the outcome for Yugoslavia was not decisive as 
yet, this is best explained by the growing iedological 
influence in American policy making. Cold War tensions were 
on the rise, and the United States tended increasingly toward 
a globalist outlook in response to the perception of a 
rapidly polarizing world. The United States continued to 
base its actions on the imperative of maintaining the balance 
of power, but in a less and less traditional form. As the 
Soviet threat seemed to grow, so grew American anticommunism, 
and American policy makers began to view the global balance 
of power through an ideological lens. 
Since the anticommunist consensus was spreading within 
both the United States government and American society at 
large, officials considered it increasingly vital to find 
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some viable form of "truly nationalist" leadership in 
Indochina through which French control could be supplanted, 
and communist control could be avoided. The fact that policy 
makers felt there was potential fOf' such a leader to draw 
support from Ho's nationalist following is best explained by 
the arrogance of power concept within the ideological 
imperative. Accor'ding to this interpretation, Americans saw 
democracy as inherently superiol' to communism as a national 
system. This indicates the growing significance of ideology 
as a motivating force in policy making. Anticommunism was 
becoming the basis upon which Indochina policy was 
formulated. 
Another crucial policy shift was the push to support Bao 
Dai in the spring of 1949. Before this point, the United 
States had been consistently pessimistic about Bao Dai's 
chances for success. But having found no viable "truly 
nationalist" leadership, the United States opted for the Bao 
Dai solution as the only alternative to Ho Chi Minh. This 
decision is reminiscent of the consistently unenthusiastic 
support the United States extended to the French in 
Indochina: in both cases the credibility imperative 
influenced predominantly realpolitik motivations in that the 
United States was unwilling to extend direct support in the 
interest of American prestige. Since neither the French 
throughout the late 1940s nor Bao Dai in 1949 was considered 
to have much likelihood for success, the United States was 
reluctant in both instances to become involved because of the 
probable negative impact on national credibility. 
With Bao Dai as with France, the United States 
nevertheless agreed to extend some measure of support for the 
purposes of a more vital national interest. With the French, 
this had been European recovecy; with Baa Dai, it was 
containment of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. 
The balance of power imperative was involved in relation to 
the imminence of communist success in China. Because of the 
assumption that communist nations would align with the Soviet 
Union in a monolithic power base, the expected Chinese 
Communist victory, and Ho's potential victory would cause a 
shift in the balance of power in the Soviets' favor. Thus 
the avoidance of a communist success in Vietnam was a primary 
national security concern. This illustrates the extent to 
which ~ealpolitik and anticommunist ideology had merged in 
American policy considerations. The concept of national 
security was being redefined in response to the perceived 
communist threat. This represents a decisive shift in 
thinking, because it contradicts Kennan's previously accepted 
division of the world into vital and peripheral areas. The 
inherent pragmatism of the balance of power approach was 
being progressively eclipsed by ideological irrationality. 
The circular reasoning of this approach would be 
legitimized in NSC 68: an area was vital to national 
security if it was perceived as threatened by communism, so a 
peripheral area that was potentially endangered became a 
vital interest. There was no differentiation involved, no 
rational structuring of the world according to priorities. 
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Rather, the tendency among American policy makers to view the 
world as involved in a global bipolar struggle prompted a 
widely expanded redefinition of national securi,ty. American 
policy toward Vietnam began to be transformed by the 
imperatives of a worldwide ideological Rtruggle. 
This interpretation of the motivation behind Vietnam 
policy planning explains the key decision in mid-1949 to 
redefine containment in East Asia. Because of the imminence 
of the communist victory in China, the Pacific perimeter was 
no longer adequate defense for East Asia. Policy makers 
began to feel the need to build a line of defense on the 
Asian continent in order to contain Chinese communism. This 
illustrates the evolution by this time of the policy of 
containment to include military means. There was a marked 
military bias in foreign policy making by 1949, and Pentagon 
influence would become much more extensive in 1950. This 
acted mainly to influence the nature and timing of American 
intervention in Vietnam, but does not explain its underlying 
themes. 
The policy outlook underwent significant changes in 
1949, but actual American policy continued to be non-
involvement with a measure of support for France. The United 
States refrained from direct intervention out of concern for 
the maintenance of credibility. Events in the fall of 1949 
precipitated the last and most crucial shift in Vietnam 
policy between 1945 and 1950: 
directly involved. 
the decision to become 
The Soviet bomb test in August led to the passage of the 
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Mutual Defense Assistance Act in September, which authorized 
funds to be used for military aid in "the general area of 
China." And the victory of the Chinese Communists by October 
resulted in the policy reassessment which suggested the use 
of MAP funding for Asia; this in turn led to the dispatch of 
the Griffin mission. These events indicate the growing 
stregnth of the military bias in foreign policy by 1950. 
Domestic politics were also influential in the decision 
to extend direct aid to Bao Dai's government in 1950. Many of 
the domestic factors that the "system worked" argument pOints 
up acted to constrain presidential decision making at this 
point. The allocation of MAP funds for Asia was the result 
of pressure from the China bloc and the China lobby for aid 
to Chinese Nationalists. Nationalist Chinese. Truman was 
forced to succumb to that pressure to some extent in order to 
get his European aid program through Congress without heavy 
opposition from the China bloc. Popular and Congressional 
criticism of the Administration's handling of China policy 
led not only to this legislative pressure but to the 
beginning of McCarthyism as well. These domestic 
repercussions of the Administration's policy toward China 
influenced the timing of intervention in Vietnam in that they 
created the necessity to act in some greater capacity in Asia 
in order to placate anticommunist critics. 
The stalemate machine has some relevance to the decision 
to intervene in 1950 in terms of the Administration's 
pessimism about the outcome of the Bao Dai solution. In 
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contrast to the quagmire thesis, Truman did not decide to 
increase American involvement under the optimistic assumption 
that the relatively small step of extending ,military aid 
would resolve the conflict in Vietnam. Rather, this step was 
taken in a period of pessimism and with full knowledge that 
it would most likely only perpetuate the stalemate. It was an 
immediate response to a perceived shift in the balance of 
power, and was seen as a viable way of staving off a 
communist Victory in Vietnam in the short r'un. This was the 
Administration's immediate aim in the face of what was 
perceived to be a greatly increased Soviet threat. An 
activist American policy in Southeast Asia was not embarked 
upon in 1950 with the illusion that it would end the war or 
eliminate the communist threat in any permanent sense. 
Domestic political factors affected the timing of the 
decision to extend direct aid to Bao Dai, but the balance of 
power was a much more influentlal consideration. The 
immediate cause of intervention was the dangerous shift in 
the balance resulting from the Soviet atomic capability and 
the Communist unification of China. The Chinese and Soviet 
extension of recognition to the DRV in January intensified 
American anxiety, and motivated immediate recognition of Bao 
Dai and the decision to support his government. 
The decision to aid Bao Dai was fundamentally the result 
of the alteration of the containment strategy in East Asia. 
It was enacted toward the aim of restoring the balance of 
power as redefined by the influence of an ticomnlUnis t 
ideology. The way policy makers perceived the role of the 
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United states in Southeast Asia was a function of the 
polarization and globalism engendered by the Cold War. The 
effect of this was the development of policies based on 
an ideological vision of the balance of power. 
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